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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
There is a substantial international economics literature regarding the 
impact of labour market and social institutions (such as trade unions and 
collective bargaining systems) on labour market performance (measured by 
indicators such as unemployment rates and job-creation).  Some recent 
installments in that literature include OECD (2006), Howell (2005), and Hein, 
Heise and Truger (2006).  The broad finding of this international research is that 
there is no predictable relationship either way between trade unionization, 
unemployment rates, and employment levels.  Countries with stronger or 
weaker unions and collective bargaining regimes may experience stronger or 
weaker labour market outcomes, depending on the other, more important 
economic and structural factors that affect labour markets (such as 
macroeconomic conditions and demographics). 
Despite these international findings, certain opponents of proposed 
changes to U.S. labour law (and, in particular, the Employee Free Choice Act) have 
attempted to argue that Canada’s labour market experience “proves” that 
unionization and collective bargaining produce higher unemployment and lower 
employment.  One consultant’s study (Layne-Farrar 2009) has been especially 
important in making this argument.  On the basis of an econometric investigation 
of labour market and unionization data from Canadian provinces, Layne-Farrar 
makes several sensational predictions regarding the negative impact of the 
Employee Free Choice Act (if passed) on U.S. labour markets – claiming that it 
would increase U.S. unemployment by 5 million or more persons, and result in 
the destruction of 2 million or more U.S. jobs.  These shocking predictions are 
justified by reference to the Canadian historical experience, and hence U.S. 
policy-makers are urged to avoid the same “mistakes” made by their northern 
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neighbours (by rejecting measures, like the Employee Free Choice Act, which might 
lead to increased U.S. union membership). 
In reality, however, Canadian labour market performance has been 
significantly stronger than in the U.S. for several years (even though Canada’s 
unionization is rate more than twice as high).  Canada’s unemployment rate is 
significantly lower than America’s, and Canada’s employment rate (the 
proportion of working-age Canadians holding jobs) has been higher than in 
America for several years.  Hence this warning to “beware” the Canadian labour 
market experience is counter-intuitive and immediately surprising.  It turns out 
that, on careful review, the empirical evidence from Canada shows that 
unionization has had no predictable impact on unemployment or employment, 
in either direction.  This article conducts a detailed econometric re-examination 
of Layne-Farrar’s counter-intuitive and sensational findings.  Our main 
conclusions include: 
 
• The Layne-Farrar regressions use an inappropriate econometric technique to 
analyze clearly trended (or “non-stationary”) time-series data.  It is well-
known in econometrics that inappropriate estimations of non-stationary data 
easily produce seeming “correlations” that are spurious and unbelievable – 
and which result solely from the fact that the analyst is comparing various 
time series which all embody non-stationary trends. (To demonstrate this 
risk, the present article reports the results of several nonsensical regressions 
successfully linking Canadian unionization, via exactly the same econometric 
specification utilized by Layne-Farrar, to a range of other obviously 
unrelated economic variables – including a price index of tobacco and alcohol 
products!  In fact, these nonsensical regressions actually perform better than 
Layne-Farrar’s more “serious” reported results.) 
 
• If the regressions are corrected for non-stationary data variables, following 
standard econometric procedures (by first-differencing relevant series, thus 
focusing analysis on the change in crucial variables rather than on their 
level), then unionization loses its consistent significance as a determinant of 
unemployment or employment. 
 
• Moreover, if the regressions are further corrected to include other key 
variables which are clearly relevant in explaining unemployment and 
employment outcomes in Canada (such as macroeconomic conditions, 
interest rates, export and commodity price cycles, and demographic factors 
such as women’s labour force participation), then there is no visible 
relationship whatsoever between unionization and either the unemployment 
rate or the employment rate in Canada.  This finding is consistent with the 
findings of the above-cited international literature on the employment and 
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unemployment effects of labour market institutions.  This point is especially 
important with respect to Layne-Farrar’s analysis of Canadian employment 
rates; Layne-Farrar excluded what has obviously been the most important 
determinant of the long-term increase in the employment rate – namely, the 
rise in women’s labour force participation.  When this key variable included 
in the regression, the significance of unionization in explaining employment 
disappears entirely. 
 
• A preliminary analysis of U.S. data (including both time-series data for the 
U.S. economy as a whole, and cross-sectional comparisons of unemployment 
and employment outcomes across states) indicates that there is no visible 
relationship between unionization and labour market outcomes in the U.S. 
context, either.  In fact, we remain puzzled why Layne-Farrar conducted her 
analysis of Canadian data in the first place (rather than focusing on the U.S. 
experience, which is of obviously more direct relevance to the Employee Free 
Choice Act debate).  Layne-Farrar’s claim that Canada’s history provides a 
“natural experiment” for her hypothesis that unionization causes higher 
unemployment and lower employment, is not valid.  Any data sample 
incorporating variation (over time and/or across jurisdictions) would have 
been equally well-suited to her study, not just the Canadian data.  The fact 
that U.S. data seems to contradict her hypothesis might explain her decision 
to focus on Canadian (rather than American) historical experience to justify 
her claim that unionization causes higher unemployment and lower 
employment – all the more so if U.S. observers were unaware of some of the 
Canadian peculiarities which Layne-Farrar omitted from her analysis (such 
as the importance of global commodity price swings to Canadian labour 
market developments).  An informed and correctly specified analysis of time-
series data from Canadian provinces shows conclusively that the claim that 
unionization in Canada has produced higher unemployment and lower 
employment is not supported by the empirical evidence. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
n the U.S. debate over proposed changes to federal labour law 
(embodied in the Employee Free Choice Act), some lobbyists have cast 
their gaze northward to Canada.2  Union membership and collective 
bargaining coverage are significantly higher in Canada than in the U.S.  Given 
the other similarities between the two countries, this provides an obvious object 
for investigation of the impacts of labour law changes which would, if 
implemented, likely lead to an expansion of trade union representation in the 
U.S. 
I
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However, policy debates can get heated, and evidence can be 
manipulated in the interests of promoting a point of view.  In this regard, 
understanding among American policy-makers of Canada’s economic and 
labour market conditions has not been furthered by a widely-circulated 
consultant’s report which argues that Canada’s stronger unionization record has 
caused higher unemployment, and lower employment, than would otherwise be 
the case: An Empirical Assessment of the Employee Free Choice Act: The Economic 
Implications, by Anne Layne-Farrar (2009).  This author suggests, on the basis of 
an econometric analysis of Canadian data, that a one percentage point increase in 
the unionization rate leads to an increase of 0.30-0.35 percentage points in the 
unemployment rate, and a decrease of 0.17-0.23 percentage points in the 
employment rate.  Extrapolated to U.S. data (and utilizing ad hoc estimates of the 
possible increase in unionization that could be expected to result from the policy 
changes being debated), the author predicts that the Employee Free Choice Act 
would cause a loss of 1.81-2.61 million U.S. jobs, and an increase of 5 million or 
even more in U.S. unemployment (Layne-Farrar 2009, pp. 23-25). 
These are headline-grabbing predictions, to be sure, and opponents of the 
proposed legislation have seized on Layne-Farrar’s Canadian results to fan 
opposition to the Employee Free Choice Act.  Printed commentary and paid 
advertising alike has urged U.S. law-makers to avoid Canada’s negative 
experience with unionization (see, for example, Packer 2009).  On the basis of 
Canadian experience, the bill’s opponents predict substantial increases in U.S. 
joblessness (at the worst possible time, given the current recession) if the 
legislation were enacted. 
These claims are immediately surprising to many Canadians, given our 
strong labour market performance in comparison to the U.S. situation.  The 
unemployment rate is lower in Canada, employment is higher as a share of the 
working age population, and both income inequality and poverty (including 
poverty among employed persons) are notably less severe in Canada than in the 
U.S.3  So how can Canada’s relatively stronger labour market experience be 
invoked to make such dire predictions regarding the impact of changes in labour 
laws that would still almost certainly leave U.S. unions weaker and 
proportionately smaller than unions in Canada? 
The Layne-Farrar findings are worthy of detailed reconsideration, to 
review the precise empirical methodology and formulation which the author 
utilized, and to consider whether her key finding (that unionization in Canada 
has increased unemployment and reduced employment) is valid. 
This article will conduct this reconsideration in the following manner.  
Section 2 summarizes the Layne-Farrar findings and raises several issues 
regarding the author’s methodology and empirical approach.  Section 3 briefly 
introduces several key features of Canada’s recent labour market evolution, for 
the benefit of American readers who may not be aware of the structure and 
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history of Canadian labour markets.  Section 4 introduces the data sources and 
variable definitions used in the rest of the article.  Section 5 considers whether 
the links between unionization, unemployment and employment are visible in 
properly formulated analyses of aggregate national Canadian data.  Section 6 
reviews in detail the specific Layne-Farrar findings (which relied on pooled time-
series data from all ten Canadian provinces).  For both the unemployment rate 
and the employment rate regressions which constitute the core of Layne-Farrar’s 
hypothesis, Section 6 first attempts to re-create the initial Layne-Farrar results, 
then corrects them for non-stationarity in included variables, and finally presents 
a more complete and appropriate formulation.  This exercise indicates 
conclusively that there is no impact of unionization visible in appropriately 
analyzed Canadian data on either the unemployment rate or the employment 
rate.  Section 7 provides an initial parallel analysis of the relationships (if any) 
between unionization, unemployment, and employment in the U.S. data.  Section 
8 summarizes our main conclusions. 
This article complements the commentaries on Layne-Farrar’s approach 
and findings that are provided in other contributions to this special issue of Just 
Labour – in particular, the papers from Fortin (2009) and Johnson (2009) – and we 
recommend that interested readers also consult those contributions. 
 
2. THE LAYNE-FARRAR HYPOTHESIS: SUMMARY AND ISSUES 
 
(A) HYPOTHESIS AND MAIN FINDINGS   
 
The Layne-Farrar study begins with a review of the main features of the 
proposed Employee Free Choice Act, and introduces her argument that the 
“unintended consequences” of that act may include a reduction in employment 
and an increase in unemployment.  She then asserts that Canada’s labour market 
experience constitutes a “natural experiment” (p.3, p.15) for considering the 
likely impacts of the proposed U.S. legislation.  This is because most Canadian 
labour law is enacted at the provincial level (about 10 percent of Canadian 
workers are covered by federal labour jurisdiction, but most fall under provincial 
labour laws).  There has been considerable variation over the years in Canadian 
provincial policies regarding the same issues which are addressed in the U.S. 
Employee Free Choice Act (in particular, different methods of union certification 
and first contract arbitration).  Hence, Layne-Farrar argues, studying the impacts 
of that policy variation across Canadian jurisdictions would provide insight into 
the likely effects of U.S. policy changes. 
The main empirical research conducted by Layne-Farrar is reported in 
Section 3 of her paper.  Here she presents the results of 3 sets of regressions: one 
linking the unemployment rate to unionization, one linking the employment rate 
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to unionization, and one linking business investment to unionization.  The 3 
regressions reported by Layne-Farrar are: 
 
• Unemployment rate regressed on a constant, union density (lagged one 
year), change in provincial GDP (lagged one and two years), and 
provincial consumer price inflation (lagged one year). 
• Employment rate regressed on a constant, union density (lagged one 
year), provincial GDP per capita (lagged one year), and the change in 
provincial GDP per capita (lagged one and two years). 
• Net business investment rate regressed on a constant, union density 
(lagged one year), the square of union density (lagged one year), and the 
change in GDP normalized as a share of the economy’s capital stock 
(lagged one and two years). 
 
All regressions are performed on a pooled set of data which includes 
annual data for all 10 Canadian provinces, utilizing three different regression 
techniques (ordinary least squares, random effects, and fixed effects models).  
The regression of business investment does not find that unionization has any 
statistically significant impact on business investment.4  For both the 
unemployment rate and the employment rate, however, the Layne-Farrar 
regressions seem to indicate that higher unionization in Canada is associated 
with both higher unemployment and lower employment (after analyzing trends 
both across Canadian provinces and over time).5  Those results form the basis for 
her extrapolation to the U.S. economy, and the startlingly pessimistic (and 
widely cited) predictions noted above. 
 
(B) CONCERNS WITH THE LAYNE-FARRAR APPROACH 
 
Before reviewing and replicating Layne-Farrar’s empirical study in detail, 
we will summarize a number of conceptual concerns raised by her approach. 
 
I. NO “NATURAL EXPERIMENT”   
 
Layne-Farrar introduces and motivates her Canadian study by suggesting 
that inter-provincial variation in labour law constitutes a “natural experiment” of 
the effects of labour law on labour market and economic performance.  
Strangely, however, her article does not actually consider that “natural” 
experiment: nowhere in the report is any empirical consideration conducted of 
the relationship between Canadian labour law and labour market outcomes 
(such as unemployment and employment).  Rather, the Layne-Farrar report 
considers a quite different relationship: the impact of unionization on 
unemployment and employment.  It is certainly true that labour legislation (such 
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as certification and first-contract arbitration procedures) can affect unionization, 
but so do many other factors (including demographic, industrial structure, 
macroeconomic, cultural, and other determinants).  Union density can in no way 
be considered a “proxy” for labour law, yet labour law itself is not incorporated 
into Layne-Farrar’s analysis.  There is no reference whatever in Layne-Farrar’s 
regressions to the inter-provincial variation in labour laws that supposedly 
sparked her interest in Canada in the first place. 
This strange disconnect between the stated goal of the study, and the 
actual question which it considers, begs the question why Layne-Farrar focused 
on Canadian data.  Exactly the same study could have been conducted using 
pooled time series and cross-sectional data on unionization and labour market 
performance across the 50 U.S. states, or across the collection of OECD 
economies, or across any other sample of data featuring variation (across time 
and across jurisdictions) in union density.  There is nothing in Layne-Farrar’s 
question or methodology that justifies a particular focus on Canada.  Surely, 
since the article is addressed to a U.S. policy debate, one would have assumed 
the author would be most interested in whether there is any impact of 
unionization visible on labour market performance in the U.S.6  Instead, the focus 
is directed to Canada. 
 
II. SAMPLE PERIOD 
 
Layne-Farrar reports that her regressions utilize a data sample of annual 
statistics from the ten Canadian provinces from 1976 through 1997.  The choice of 
this particular sample period is curious (a point raised by Johnson 2009).  It likely 
occurred in part because the author references earlier empirical work by Johnson 
(2002), which did empirically analyze the impact of inter-provincial variation in 
Canadian labour law on union density over the period up to 1997.  (Layne-
Farrar, contrary to the implied goal of her study, does not directly consider the 
impact of that inter-provincial variation in labour law.)  Since Layne-Farrar is 
testing the relationship labour market performance and unionization (not labour 
law), there is no empirical reason to conform her sample to Johnson’s earlier 
work, but she does anyway.7  In reality, her actual data sample is different from 
the stated 1976 to 1997 period.  First, provincial level GDP and inflation data is 
not available prior to 1981 and 1980, respectively (a point which Layne-Farrar 
acknowledges in her data appendix, but not in her discussion of regression 
results).  Moreover, the data series for union density used by Layne-Farrar ends 
in 1995.8  Arbitrarily (and presumably again to “match” her sample period with 
that of Johnson 2002, even though there is no empirical or methodological reason 
to do so), Layne-Farrar then extends the data set by two years by “linearly 
extrapolating” the key independent variable used in all of her regressions 
(namely, union density), thus allowing her to conduct her regressions on a 
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sample set extending to 1997.  This is a highly unusual approach, which would 
seem to carry a significant risk of mistaken inference utilizing these artificially-
extended data series. 
In effect, the Layne-Farrar results are based on a true original data set 
which only begins in 1981 (with the advent of provincial GDP data) and ends in 
1995 – for a total of fifteen years of true data (as opposed to her “linearly 
extrapolated” data set).  After accounting for lags in her specification of control 
variables, the adjusted regression sample begins only in 1984 (the first year for 
which the regression can include the twice-lagged change in GDP and GDP per 
capita, as noted above), thus providing for twelve years of data.  The re-creation 
of Layne-Farrar’s core results conducted in Section 6 below utilizes this 12-year 
sample period; it then conducts additional regressions utilizing the longer 
sample period afforded by the inclusion of data up to 2008. 
 
III. NON-STATIONARITY OF VARIABLES 
 
This is probably the most serious methodological weakness in the Layne-
Farrar approach, and the one which casts most doubt on both her empirical 
findings and subsequent U.S. predictions.  It is well-known in econometrics that 
regression of non-stationary variables (or, equivalently, variables which possess 
a unit root) can give rise to spurious correlations and invalid conclusions.  The 
essence of this problem can be summarized simply as follows: many economic 
variables demonstrate a tendency to move in a direction over time.  Regressing 
one time-trended variable on another can then suggest an apparent “causal link” 
between them, simply because both demonstrate a time trend.9  Economists have 
grappled with this methodological issue by developing a portfolio of methods to 
test for the presence of a time trend (or “non-stationarity”) in the variables 
included in a regression.  Where such trends exist, it is important for the 
practitioner to adjust the variables (by normalizing them, or measuring period-
to-period changes in the data rather than their level) before conducting 
econometric analysis. 
Layne-Farrar does not report any tests for the stationarity of her 
variables.  We have conducted these tests on all variables appearing in the two 
key regressions above (for the unemployment rate and the employment rate, 
respectively); the results of these stationarity tests are reported (on a province-
by-province basis) in Table 1.  Not surprisingly, there is very strong evidence to 
conclude that nearly all of the variables considered by Layne-Farrar are non-
stationary.  If the variables were adjusted by converting into first-differenced 
formulations, the problem of non-stationarity would largely be avoided (as 
indicated on the right side of Table 1). 
This is not an abstract, “technical” issue.  The problem of non-stationarity 
is fundamental to the credibility of the regression results which form the 
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foundation for Layne-Farrar’s startling predictions.  To understand the 
importance of this problem, consider the set of regressions summarized in Table 
2.  The first regression (in Column A) reproduces the Layne-Farrar regression for 
the unemployment rate (in which unemployment is explained by lagged 
unionization, once- and twice-lagged change in real GDP, and lagged CPI 
inflation), applied to aggregate national Canadian data.10  This core equation 
generates results broadly similar to the pooled results reported by Layne-Farrar: 
lagged unionization seems to have a strongly significant positive impact on the 
unemployment rate; the control variables have varying degrees of significance 
(the lagged change in GDP is especially significant); and the equation has an 
overall “good fit” (with an adjusted R2 value of 0.725, indicating that the 
equation “explains” almost three-quarters of the variation in Canadian 
unemployment over time). 
To dramatize the dangers of regressing non-stationary variables, 
however, the subsequent columns of Table 2 then take exactly the same set of 
explanatory variables (lagged unionization, once- and twice-lagged change in 
GDP, and lagged inflation) to “explain” four other seemingly unrelated 
macroeconomic variables: the level of taxes paid to the Canadian government by 
non-residents, depreciation (or capital consumption) allowances charged against 
Canadian fixed capital, the total outstanding stock of consumer credit, and the 
level of prices for tobacco and alcohol products.  With no changes in data or 
specification of the equation, unionization does a “better job” of explaining each of 
these other Canadian variables, than it does of “explaining” the unemployment 
rate.  Equations B through E all demonstrate a better fit, and a better range of 
significant explanatory variables, than does the regression of the unemployment 
rate on unionization.  A plausible theory could be developed to explain each of 
these correlations.11  But of course the regressions are spurious, “proving” only 
that it is awfully easy to find significant correlations among non-stationary 
variables.  Unionization does a better job of explaining beer and cigarette prices, 
than of explaining Canadian unemployment!  This should give the serious 
analyst considerable pause before leaping to dramatic conclusions about the 
supposedly destructive labour market impacts of unionization. 
For this reason, a central theme of the analysis reported below is to test 
the Layne-Farrar results for their sensitivity to the inclusion of non-stationary 
variables.  It turns out that when the regressions are corrected for this problem 
(by using first-differenced variables, which are less likely to possess a unit root), 
the purported relationship between unionization and poor labour market 
performance collapses. 
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IV. RANDOM EFFECTS METHODOLOGY 
 
Layne-Farrar reports three full sets of pooled regression results, for each 
of the considered equations: one using OLS estimation, one with random effects 
adjustments to the constant terms, and one with fixed effects adjustments to the 
constant terms.  There is some difference in the precise coefficients resulting from 
each of these estimation methodologies,12 but no major qualitative shift in her 
parameter estimates.  However, the author’s use of the random effects estimation 
(also called, in some applications, an “error components” approach) is puzzling 
in this context.  The random effects specification assumes that the cross-sectional 
units are randomly selected from a larger sample, and hence the error term 
corresponding to each cross-section will itself reflect the properties of a random 
variable.  This situation would not seem to apply to the present regressions, 
which utilize a pooled data set for the complete set of ten Canadian provinces 
(not a sample of jurisdictions); hence the variables being measured reflect the 
performance of an entire provincial labour market (not a random sample of 
agents).  In our judgment the random effects estimation methodology is not 
appropriate in this setting; however, to preserve the completeness of the 
comparison of our results to Layne-Farrar’s in the following sections, we will 
nevertheless report random effects estimations of our major equations.  In some 
cases in the corrected regressions which follow, the choice of specific estimator 
does make an important difference (qualitatively as well as quantitatively) to 
parameter estimates (see Tables 6 and 8).  In these cases, it is our judgment that 
the random effects results should be discounted from the analysis, and more 
emphasis placed on the OLS and fixed effects findings. 
 
V. ARBITRARY INCLUSION OF CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
Layne-Farrar includes in her regressions a particular set of 
macroeconomic “control” variables which are held to account for the many other 
influences on unemployment and employment (other than the hypothesized 
effect of unionization).  However, there are a very large number of different ways 
in which those control variables can be specified (including different variables, 
different forms of those variables, and different lag structures).  For example, her 
unemployment rate regression utilizes the change in real GDP as a control 
variable, but the employment rate regression utilizes the change in real per 
capita GDP as a control variable.  The criteria on which a control variable is 
included or not included is not discussed; the criteria is not statistical significance 
(in fact, neither of the change in per capita GDP control variables included in the 
employment rate regressions are statistically significant in any of the three 
specifications reported, yet they were retained within the final reported 
specifications; and several control variables included in the reported 
39   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society – V.15 – Special Edition – Nov. 09 
  
unemployment rate variables are also not statistically significant).  This indicates 
a degree of arbitrariness in equation specification and estimation which throws 
into question the robustness of the resulting findings.  Without specifying the 
sensitivity of estimated results to the inclusion and non-inclusion of various 
forms and combinations of these control variables, and/or without specifying a 
search algorithm through which the final specification was generated, we cannot 
know if the particular results reported are simply those which simply seemed to 
support the author’s case most strongly. 
Remember in this context that Layne-Farrar has not just indicated that, 
based on these results, she expects stronger unionization to lead to weaker 
labour market performance in the U.S.  She has actually provided precise 
numerical predictions regarding the likely scale of those effects (claims which 
generated considerable public attention for her point of view).  In this context, 
however, it is not just whether an included control variable affects the statistical 
significance of the union density term (which is her main object of inquiry); it 
also becomes very important how they affect the specific numerical value of each 
coefficient.  In reality, the precise job loss estimates projected by Layne-Farrar 
will vary dramatically based on the specific control variables included; this 
important but technical issue was surely not understood or even considered in 
the popular commentary that was sparked by her findings. 
 
VI. OMITTED VARIABLES 
 
Other than the seemingly arbitrary inclusion of a couple of 
macroeconomic “control” variables discussed above, the Layne-Farrar 
regressions seem to presume that unionization is the only independent 
explanatory variable which causes variation in unemployment and employment 
performance over time.  In reality, of course, labour market performance reflects 
a wide range of macroeconomic, structural, and demographic causal factors.  (In 
the Canadian context, some of these factors are summarized in Section 3 of this 
paper.)  By reducing the issue to a simple test of the relevance or not of 
unionization as an explanation for unemployment or employment, the Layne-
Farrar regressions miss the importance of these other factors.  In econometric 
terms, the regressions likely suffer from mis-specification bias, throwing into 
further doubt the reliability and credibility of the estimated coefficients.13 
 
VII. SERIAL CORRELATION OF ERROR TERM 
 
It is conventional practice in econometric analysis to report a measure of 
observed serial correlation in the residuals generated by estimated equations (the 
most commonly reported measure is the Durbin-Watson statistic).  This 
information helps to determine whether the error term is appropriately “well-
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behaved” to allow for standard statistical inference to be conducted on the 
significance of estimated parameters.  Unusually, Layne-Farrar does not report 
this information (neither in the summary tables, nor in the more detailed 
regression results included in the appendix to her paper).  Given the non-
stationarity of her considered variables, as well as the strong possibility of bias 
resulting from omitted variables (bias which is often signified by very low 
Durbin-Watson scores), we would suspect Durbin-Watson scores in her 
regressions to be low – and thus consistent with the presence of serial correlation.  
In Tables 5 and 8 below, we have re-created Layne-Farrar’s results using a 
pooled data set covering the same time period as her regressions.  In those re-
created regressions, Durbin-Watson scores were indeed very low (significantly 
lower than the critical threshold of 2, and below 1 in most cases), strongly 
suggesting the presence of serial correlation and/or mis-specification bias (which 
should be corrected using techniques such as autoregressive estimation, the 
inclusion of omitted variables, and other methods).  In this case the standard 
tests of statistical significance invoked by Layne-Farrar to justify her findings are 
not valid.  Her failure to even report Durbin-Watson scores, let alone to correct 
her findings for obvious problems in the residuals, is a serious shortcoming of 
her analysis. 
 
VIII. INTERPRETATION OF ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS 
 
In spite of all these methodological concerns with the basic Layne-Farrar 
approach, even if the estimated coefficients could be considered to provide a 
reasonable and reliable portrayal of the impact of unionization on labour market 
performance, Layne-Farrar’s sensational application of those estimated 
coefficients in order to generate predictions regarding the large estimated effects 
of the Employee Free Choice Act on U.S. labour market performance is also 
questionable.  (Johnson 2009 also considers these issues in detail.) 
First, since Layne-Farrar did not actually investigate the impact of 
changes in labour law on union density, she relies on various ad hoc estimates of 
the possible impact of the new U.S. labour law on U.S. unionization (citing the 
hopeful predictions of several U.S. union leaders) to “base” her counter-factual 
simulations and predictions.  Her subsequent predictions of the economic after-
effects of those assumed changes in unionization thus depend completely on the 
validity of these initial projections of the impact of the legislative change on 
unionization (since unionization, not legislation, is the independent variable in 
her model).  She eventually settles on two simulation cases (summarized in her 
Table 14, p. 41): one in which the new legislation boosts unionization by five 
percentage points, and one in which it boosts unionization by ten percentage 
points.  This approach is extremely arbitrary. 
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Second, Layne-Farrar assumes (on the basis of her equation specification) 
that the full impact of a change in unionization is experienced within a single 
year.  The simulation summarized in her Table 14 assumes that unionization 
grows by 5 or 10 percentage points in the year immediately following the 
implementation of the new legislation.  This is an impossible suggestion, given 
the lengthy periods of adjustment through which labour markets would respond 
to deep institutional and structural changes. 
Third, Layne-Farrar’s regressions actually estimate the impact of 
unionization on the unemployment and employment rates.  But her headline-
generating predictions are also phrased in terms of absolute numbers of 
unemployed and employed.  To convert from an estimated impact of 
unionization on unemployment and employment rates, to estimated impacts in 
absolute numbers of unemployed and employed, requires strong assumptions to 
be made regarding the evolution of demographic and labour market variables in 
the presence and absence of the counterfactual policy shock.  Layne-Farrar 
documents these assumptions (pp. 41-45), but provides no specific 
argumentation to support the assumptions that are embedded in her 
extrapolation.  Her estimates of the impact of higher unionization on 
unemployment and employment (reported in the fourth and sixth columns of 
her Table 14) assume no change in labour force participation, monetary and fiscal 
policy, or any of the other macroeconomic or demographic variables which are 
likely to change in the event of such a seemingly large and sudden labour force 
shock.  Moreover, those separate estimates are not internally consistent.  Layne-
Farrar predicts increases in absolute unemployment that are approximately 2.5 
times as large as the predicted decrease in employment.  (This is because the 
upper and lower bounds of her estimated coefficients for lagged unionization in 
the unemployment rate equations are about 2.5 times larger, in absolute terms, 
than the corresponding coefficients on lagged unionization in the employment 
rate equations.)  In her worst-case simulation, unemployment grows by 5.42 
million, even though employment only fell by 2.27 million.  This implies that 3 
million additional Americans must have joined the labour market (equivalent to 
a substantial increase in the participation rate of about 1.25 percentage points, 
experienced at exactly the same time as millions of jobs were disappearing).  
Indeed, a strict reading of Layne-Farrar’s simulation suggests that by far the 
largest labour market impact of unionization is on labour force participation (not 
on employment per se).  This is implausible.  More important, the assumed 
significant (and counter-intuitive) increase in labour force participation is 
inconsistent with the assumption of constant labour force participation which 
was required in the first place for Layne-Farrar to convert her estimate of a 
change in the unemployment rate into a change in absolute unemployment. 
Layne-Farrar performs a second and even more curious simulation 
exercise, summarized in her Table 15 (p. 42), where the change in unionization is 
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assumed to be experienced over a multi-year period, again justified by reference 
to an ad-hoc (and clearly hopeful!) prediction made by a union leader.  This 
simulation extrapolates an annual increase in union membership of 1.5 million 
per year over the next decade (resulting in a near-doubling of unionization over 
that period).  On the basis of assumptions regarding labour force and 
employment growth (including the odd and inconsistent assumption that 
employment grows at the same rate as the labour force, despite the doubling of 
unionization which Layne-Farrar believes will have strong negative impacts on 
job-creation), Layne-Farrar then predicts that unemployment will more than 
double, and the unemployment rate would rise by about 9 percentage points 
(reaching about 15 percent).  Layne-Farrar does not simulate her employment 
rate coefficients in this simulation (no doubt because she has already assumed, in 
the extrapolation, that employment grows at the same rate as the labour force – 
and hence there is no impact of unionization on employment at all).  The 
underlying assumption that unemployment could rise to 15 percent with no 
impact on future labour force growth, fiscal and monetary policy, or other 
macroeconomic linkages is, frankly, bizarre. 
On the whole, the scale of predicted impacts of unionization utilized in 
Layne-Farrar’s simulations seems extraordinarily large.  To give another 
perspective on this, consider her oft-quoted “rule of thumb” (based on the 
Canadian regressions) that an increase in unionization of one percentage point, 
leads to an increase in the unemployment rate of around 0.3 percentage points.  
On that basis, assume that Canadian policy-makers actually believed these 
findings, and decided it would be sensible to reduce unionization in Canada to 
U.S. levels.  The resulting decline in union density (from around 30 percent at 
present in Canada, to around 12 percent to match U.S. levels) would result in an 
unemployment rate approximately equal to zero.  In several provinces, the 
unemployment rate would become negative!  (Which begs another obvious 
question: namely, why, if lower unionization leads to such improved labour 
market performance, does any unemployment exist at all in the U.S.?) 
The Layne-Farrar findings, based on Canadian data, have proven to be 
powerful ammunition in the aggressive effort by U.S. employer lobbyists to 
defeat the proposed Employee Free Choice Act.  However, they are based on an 
approach that violates important rules of elementary econometrics (regarding 
spurious regressions of non-stationary variables).  They ignore other important 
determinants of Canadian labour market performance.  Layne-Farrar’s 
application of her own findings to make predictions of the impact of legislative 
changes on U.S. labour market outcomes is arbitrary, internally inconsistent, and 
unbelievable.  Finally, there was no particular reason for her to base her research 
on Canadian data in the first place – since the so-called “natural experiment” that 
sparked her initial interest in Canada was not actually incorporated into her own 
empirical analysis. 
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For all these reasons it would be far-fetched to conclude that the Layne-
Farrar findings provide any reasonable insight into the behaviour of Canadian 
labour markets (including the impact, whether positive or negative, of 
unionization) – let alone that those findings would provide any reliable guide to 
the impact of labour law changes in the U.S. (a country where Layne-Farrar 
could have performed exactly the same analysis, but chose not to).  The 
remaining sections of this paper shall attempt to provide a more complete 
analysis of the impact of unionization on labour market performance in Canada 
(using both national and provincial-level data), and a more reasonable discussion 
of the application of those findings to the U.S. context. 
 
3. STRUCTURES AND TRENDS IN CANADIAN LABOUR MARKETS 
 
The Layne-Farrar study focuses its attention on a single core explanatory 
variable, union density, which is hypothesized to explain unemployment, 
employment, and business investment in the ten Canadian provinces.  While her 
regressions include selected macroeconomic “control” variables (and, as noted 
above, the specification and inclusion of those control variables was rather 
arbitrary), there is no full-fledged discussion of the various macroeconomic, 
demographic, and structural factors which together could provide a more 
complete depiction of trends in Canadian labour market performance over time 
and across provincial jurisdictions.  Here are several of the key features of 
Canada’s recent labour market performance which U.S. readers should keep in 
mind, as they consider whether Canada’s stronger patterns of unionization have 
had any impact on economic and labour market performance. 
 
(A) SWINGS IN MONETARY POLICY 
 
Monetary policy and central bank behaviour are obvious key factors 
influencing the evolution of labour market performance.  Canada has 
experienced important swings in monetary policy-making during the period 
covered by Layne-Farrar’s regressions, and these factors should be included 
within any credible analysis of unemployment and employment.  In particular, 
during the late 1980s and 1990s, Canada’s central bank demonstrated a uniquely 
aggressive and strict approach to inflation control.  The Bank of Canada was one 
of the first in the world to adopt inflation targeting as its central behaviour rule, 
and it stuck to its interest-rate guns very strictly during the early years of this 
regime.  During the early 1990s, Canada’s real interest rates were uniquely high 
in comparison to other countries, and this was a key factor in the uniquely deep 
and long recession which Canada experienced at that time (with consequent 
impacts on unemployment and employment rates).  Policy showed more 
flexibility in later years, and Canadian monetary and credit conditions became 
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more typical of those in other OECD countries.  This history is discussed in detail 
in MacLean and Osberg (1996) and Banting, Sharpe, and St.-Hilaire (2001).  It is 
important to note that the period of strictest monetary policy conforms to a 
period of relatively high unionization in Canada.14  Since the mid-1990s, 
monetary policy has eased (reflected in falling real interest rates) at the same 
time as unionization has declined.  A complete model of unemployment or 
employment would include interest rates, credit conditions, and/or other 
variables reflecting monetary policy and monetary conditions. 
 
(B) OTHER FACTORS IN THE 1990S RECESSION 
 
Canada’s labour market indicators have historically tracked U.S. 
performance closely, however there was a marked divergence during the 1990s – 
following Canada’s uniquely severe recession, and subsequently slow recovery.  
Early in that decade Canadian unemployment rates rose far above U.S. levels, 
and employment rates plunged even further (fueled both by job loss and 
declining labour force participation).15  In addition to Canada’s divergent 
monetary policy discussed above, other factors which contributed to that 
uniquely weak period in Canadian labour market performance include the 
adjustment to the new Canada-U.S. free trade agreement (which was associated 
with a major decline in Canada’s manufacturing sector), adjustment to an 
overvalued exchange rate (reflecting in part very high Canadian interest rates), 
and a subsequent major fiscal retrenchment by government beginning in 1995.  
This unique conjuncture of circumstances in the 1990s makes it especially 
important to consider the full range of potential macroeconomic conditions 
before attributing Canada’s poor labour market performance at that time to 
unionization. 
 
(C) COMMODITY BOOMS AND BUSTS 
 
Canada is a major exporter of natural resource products (including 
energy, minerals, forestry, and agricultural goods).  Swings in global market 
conditions for these primary exports have been associated with major swings in 
Canada’s overall macroeconomic conditions (including unemployment and 
employment, exchange rate and terms of trade shocks, and major swings in 
international trade and investment balances).  Moreover, an important issue for 
the purposes of this study is the fact that these resources (especially petroleum 
and mineral deposits) are distributed unevenly across Canada.  This means that 
inter-provincial variation in labour markets will depend, in part, on the state of 
commodity markets, exports, and production.  This effect has been especially 
important in the post-free-trade era of Canada’s economic development, during 
which period the relative importance of petroleum and other mineral exports has 
45   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society – V.15 – Special Edition – Nov. 09 
  
grown significantly, at the same time as unprecedented global price volatility has 
been experienced in those energy and minerals markets.  The richest three 
Canadian provinces (on the basis of per capita GDP) are those which produce 
and export petroleum (Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland).  Attempting 
to account for interprovincial variation in labour market performance without 
taking account of the regionally diverse nature of these resource shocks would 
immediately strike any Canadian economist as a serious conceptual error.  To 
address this shortcoming, resource price, exchange rate, and export performance 
variables will be included in the more complete models of Canadian 
unemployment and employment specified below.16 
 
(D) OTHER INSTITUTIONAL VARIATIONS 
 
Some economists have argued that changes in Canada’s unemployment 
insurance system have influenced unemployment rates, in large part via the 
impact of the system’s rules on the decision of non-employed individuals to 
participate or not participate in the labour force.  A very substantial tightening of 
the program’s accessibility beginning in the early 1990s may have contributed to 
a decline in reported unemployment rates (if not to an increase in actual 
employment) since that time.  Varying evidence on the importance of this factor 
is reported by Fortin, Keil and Symons (2001); Riddell (2005); and Zagorsky 
(1996).  In its comprehensive review of international experience, the OECD (2006) 
finds that unionization is not significantly correlated with unemployment, but 
suggests that the generosity of unemployment insurance may be.17  An attempt 
to explain the evolution of Canadian unemployment and employment rates on 
the basis of variation in institutional and policy variables should probably have 
considered this important feature of Canada’s labour policy landscape, which 
past research has suggested could be significant. 
 
(E) DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
 
Labour markets are composed of both supply and demand sides, and 
demographic trends in labour supply are surely a central factor which should be 
included in any comprehensive model of employment and unemployment 
performance.  Of particular relevance in the Canadian case has been the secular 
increase in women’s labour force participation which dominates changes in 
labour supply over the past three decades.  Canadian female participation has 
grown virtually every year since 1976 (when the current household labour force 
survey was initiated); it increased during this time from 45 percent to 63 percent.  
The rise in women’s participation is also clearly the dominant factor behind the 
long-run increase in the employment rate in Canada.  There are significant 
differences in female participation between Canadian provinces (reflecting the 
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age and mobility of the workforce).  In particular, rapidly-growing petroleum-
rich provinces (such as Alberta and Saskatchewan) are characterized by a 
younger workforce, with more inward migration, and higher female labour force 
participation.  These demographic factors should be incorporated into analysis of 
labour market performance over time or across provinces; otherwise, the 
importance of differences in female participation could be “picked up” (in a mis-
specified model) by any other time-trended variable. 
This risk seems especially acute in Layne-Farrar’s employment rate 
regressions.  By modeling a time trended variable (the employment rate) but 
excluding from the right-hand side of the equation an underlying secular change 
(women’s growing participation) that is closely associated with that trend, she 
could mis-attribute the growth in employment rate to some other time-trended 
variable which was included in her regression (namely, in her case, the secular 
decline in unionization). 
In summary, before relying on the Canadian experience to provide a 
guide to the likely impact in America of legislative changes being considered 
there, the analyst would be well-advised to consider the full range of structural, 
macroeconomic, and demographic variables which have clearly influenced 
Canadian labour market performance over time.  The Layne-Farrar analysis takes 
no effect of monetary policy and credit conditions; export, terms of trade, and 
commodity market developments; or demographic trends (such as the dramatic 
growth of female labour force participation).  This throws into question the 
reliability of the resulting estimated coefficients (which would almost certainly 
be biased as a result of excluding or mis-attributing the explanatory power of 
omitted variables).  The analysis reported below shall attempt to fill in these gaps 
with a more complete analysis. 
 
4. DATA DEFINITION AND SOURCES 
 
This section describes the variables included in the regression analyses 
reported below.  For Canadian series, the identifier number for the relevant 
original data table from the Statistics Canada CANSIM database is provided.  All 
series are annual. 
 
(A) CANADIAN SERIES (PROVINCE-SPECIFIC) 
 
Unemployment rate: Unemployed as share of labour force, 15 and over 
(2820002). 
 
Employment rate: Employed as share of working age population, 15 years or 
older (2820002). 
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Unionization: Union membership/coverage as proportion of employment.  
Source for pre-1995 data is the CAULRA survey of trade unions, union 
membership as share total paid employment (2790027).  Source for post-1997 
data is the household labour force survey; union coverage is calculated as union-
covered workers divided by total paid employment (2820078).  The data point for 
1996 is interpolated between the 1995 and 1997 values. 
 
Change in real GDP: The first difference in real (chained $2002) GDP (Canada 
3800017; provinces 3840002).  For province-specific data, this series commences 
in 1981. 
 
CPI inflation: To be compatible with the comparisons reported below between 
levels and first-differenced equations, the log of CPI (all items, 2005 basket, 
2002=100; 3260021) is utilized as a measure of consumer prices in levels 
equations, and the first difference of the log of CPI is utilized in first-differenced 
equations.  Province-specific CPI data becomes available beginning in 1979. 
 
(B) CANADIAN SERIES (AGGREGATE NATIONAL) 
 
The following national-level-only data series were also included as potential 
explanatory variables in the pooled regressions below. 
 
Change in interest rate: First difference of the annual average of the Bank of 
Canada bank rate (from Canadian Economic Observer Historical Statistical 
Supplement, 11-210X, Table 7.1). 
 
Change in business and household credit: First difference of the total outstanding 
stock of business and household credit, as reported by the Bank of Canada 
(1760032). 
 
Change in commodity prices: First difference of the log of Bank of Canada index 
of non-energy commodity prices (in $US, 1760001). 
 
Change in oil prices: First difference of the log of Bank of Canada index of energy 
prices (in $US, 1760001). 
 
Change in exports: First difference in real (chained $2002) exports of goods and 
services (3800017). 
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(C) SPURIOUS REGRESSION DEPENDENT VARIABLES (AGGREGATE NATIONAL) 
 
The following national-level-only data series were included as dependent 
variables in the spurious regressions reported in Table 2 above. 
 
Tax payments of non-residents: Aggregate tax revenues paid on income by non-
residents to all levels of Canadian government (3800007). 
 
Capital consumption allowance: Depreciation allowance on fixed capital from 
national income and expenditure accounts (3800016). 
 
Consumer credit: Total outstanding stock of consumer debt, as reported by the 
Bank of Canada (1760032). 
 
Price index of alcoholic beverages and tobacco products: 2005 basket, 2002=100 
(3260021). 
 
(D) U.S. NATIONAL TIME SERIES DATA 
 
The following variables are utilized for the time-series regressions of national 
U.S. data reported in Tables 11 and 12. 
 
Union membership as share employment, all wage and salary workers: from 
http://www.unionstats.com.  
 
Unemployment rate: Unemployment as share of labour force, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics series LNU04000000. 
 
Employment rate: Employment as share of working-age population, 16 and over, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics series LNU02300000. 
 
Change in real GDP ($2005 chained): from Table 1.1.6, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, economicindicators.gov 
database. 
 
Consumer prices: Log of consumer prices (U.S. all items all urban consumers, 
1982-84=100) and change in the log, for first-differenced regressions, as reported 
by Bureau of Labor Statistics series CUUR0000SA0. 
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(F) U.S. CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA 
 
The following data series were utilized in the cross-sectional regressions of U.S. 
state data reported below in Table 13. 
 
State unemployment rate (2008):  Unemployment as share labour force, 
statewide, from Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv. 
 
State employment rate (2008):  Employment as share non-institutional civilian 
population ager 16 or over, statewide, from Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics  http://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm. 
 
Union membership as share total employment (2007): lagged one year, as 
reported by the Statistical Abstract of the U.S., Table 644, 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab.  
 
Change in state real GDP (2006 and 2007, chained $2000): lagged one and two 
years, as reported by the Statistical Abstract of the U.S., Table 649, 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab.  
 
State inflation (2007): lagged one year.  No CPI data are available for U.S. states. 
Inflation is therefore measured by the change in the GDP price deflator for each 
state, as calculated from current and chained GDP data reported by the Statistical 
Abstract of the U.S., Table 649, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab.  
 
Women’s labour force participation (2007): lagged one year, as reported by the 
Statistical Abstract of the U.S., Table 573, 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab.  
 
5. REGRESSIONS UTILIZING NATIONAL CANADIAN TIME-SERIES 
DATA 
 
In this section, the two key reported Layne-Farrar specifications (relating 
the unemployment rate to lagged unionization, once and twice-lagged GDP 
growth, and lagged inflation; and relating the employment rate to lagged 
unionization and once and twice-lagged GDP per capita) are applied to 
aggregate Canadian data collected at the national level.  The purpose of these 
estimations is to consider whether Layne-Farrar’s findings are visible in national 
time series data (as distinct from the pooled cross-sectional/time-series 
provincial data which she analyzes), and also to highlight the sensitivity of her 
findings to the non-stationarity issue highlighted above. 
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Table 3 reports the results of 3 regressions applied to national Canadian 
data on the unemployment rate.  Column A reports the replication of the exact 
equation structure for the unemployment rate reported in Layne-Farrar’s Table 3.  
It indicates (consistent with her findings) that lagged unionization is a 
statistically significant (at the 99% level) determinant of unemployment, with the 
expected positive sign.  Once-lagged GDP is also significant; the other Layne-
Farrar “control” variables (twice-lagged GDP and lagged CPI) are not.18  As 
reported in Table 1 above, however, all the variables contained in this 
specification demonstrate strong secular time trends, and this non-stationarity 
introduces a significant risk of invalid (spurious) inference. 
Converted to first-difference terms (in which case the hypothesis of non-
stationarity on the unemployment rate can be rejected at the 99% level, and for 
the right-hand-side variables at the 95% level, all as reported in Table 1), the 
equation is re-estimated in Column B.  In this case the equation loses most of its 
explanatory power.  None of the right-hand-side variables (including 
unionization) are statistically significant, and the adjusted R2 value falls by two-
thirds.  In other words, after controlling for the non-stationarity of all of the 
variables modeled by Layne-Farrar, no evidence is found that unionization is a 
significant predictor of the unemployment rate. 
We hypothesized earlier that a complete model of Canadian labour 
market performance would incorporate several key macroeconomic, structural, 
and demographic factors that were ignored by Layne-Farrar’s approach.  
Column C therefore reports the findings of a more complete model 
(appropriately formulated in first-difference terms) of the Canadian 
unemployment rate.  This model includes changes in consumer prices, changes 
in interest rates, changes in credit conditions, changes in export demand, and 
changes in commodity prices as explanatory variables.  All are significant with 
expected signs.  With this more complete set of right-hand-side variables, the 
lagged first-difference of GDP loses its significance.  Most important for this 
discussion, the coefficient for unionization is near-zero and non-significant in 
this specification (in fact, it is slightly negative).  In other words, when the 
complete set of macroeconomic and structural factors is incorporated into the 
analysis, unionization has no value as an explanatory variable of the 
unemployment rate. 
Table 4 reports results of the same exercise applied to national-level 
Canadian time-series data on the employment rate.  Again, Column A simply 
applies exactly the same specification reported in Layne-Farrar’s Table 4 (lagged 
unionization, lagged GDP per capita, and once- and twice-lagged GDP per 
capita).  In this case, unionization is not statistically significant even in the levels 
regression (Column A).  Lagged GDP per capita is the only significant right-
hand-side variable in Layne-Farrar’s initial set.  In a first-differenced regression 
of the same specification (Column B), none of the right-hand-side variables are 
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significant, and the equation loses most of its explanatory power.  In a complete 
first-difference formulation incorporating macroeconomic, structural, and 
demographic determinants (Column C), a strong fit is attained (with adjusted R2 
higher than in the original levels regression), and strong significance is attached 
to changes in GDP, changes in interest rates, changes in oil prices, and changes in 
consumer credit.  As expected, demographic factors – namely the rise in 
women’s labour force participation – are highly significant in understanding the 
behaviour of the employment rate.  Unionization is found to have no significant 
influence on the employment rate in any of these specifications. 
These experiments already suggest that Layne-Farrar’s findings may 
indeed be highly dependent on correlations among time-trended variables, and 
that her inferences based on regressions of those non-stationary variables are 
suspect.  In a fully-specified and stationary model of unemployment and 
employment rates using Canadian national time-series data, there is no 
statistically significant relationship between unionization and either the 
unemployment rate or the employment rate. 
 
6. REGRESSIONS UTILIZING POOLED PROVINCIAL CROSS-SECTIONAL 
TIME-SERIES DATA 
 
This section conducts a similar exercise as Section 5, but this time 
utilizing the same pooled cross-sectional/time-series provincial approach that 
Layne-Farrar utilized in her own analysis.  We first attempt to replicate her 
findings using level regressions, for the time period covered by her true original 
data (1984 to 1995).19  We also apply her specification to the full time period 
covered by available data (stretching out to 2008), in order to consider whether 
her findings are sensitive to the time period being covered.  Finally, in light of 
the fact that the Canadian data set for unionization experiences a break in the 
1995-1997 period20, we also conduct the analysis for the post-splice sample 
period.  For the levels regressions this post-splice sample period begins in 1998 
and runs through 2008; for the first-differenced equations, it begins in 1999.21  
After replicating her results, we re-estimate the model using first-differenced 
variables (to correct for the non-stationarity of her data).  Finally, we also 
incorporate other key determinants of unemployment and employment into the 
model (including macroeconomic, structural, and demographic variables).  In the 
end, the relationship Layne-Farrar posits between unionization and 
unemployment or employment collapses entirely.  This entire exercise is 
performed in two parts: first for the unemployment rate equation, and then for 
the employment rate equation. 
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(A) UNEMPLOYMENT RATE REGRESSIONS 
 
I. RE-CREATING THE LAYNE-FARRAR RESULTS (LEVELS)  
 
Table 5 reports our effort to re-create the broad results which Layne-
Farrar attained using a levels regression on pooled cross-sectional time-series 
data from the ten Canadian provinces (and which were reported in her Table 3).22  
Following Layne-Farrar, the pooled regression is conducted using three different 
methodologies: OLS, fixed effects, and random effects.23  Exactly the same 
specification is utilized, with the unemployment rate dependent on lagged 
unionization, once- and twice-lagged changes in GDP, and lagged consumer 
prices.  Using levels data in the initial shorter sample period (1984 through 1995), 
we find (as did Layne-Farrar) that the lagged unionization rate seems to be a 
strongly significant determinant of unemployment, with coefficients ranging 
from approximately 0.30 to 0.47 (depending on choice of estimator).  In fact, these 
coefficients are slightly larger than those reported by Layne-Farrar (which 
ranged from 0.30 to 0.35); this difference may reflect our decision not to 
extrapolate the dependent variable to 1996 and 1997, the specific formulation of 
our inflation variable, or other small differences in the regression. The GDP 
control variables are significant; our inflation variable is not.  Qualitatively, these 
levels results are comparable to those reported in Layne-Farrar’s Table 3.  The 
Durbin-Watson statistic24 for the levels regressions is low (well below the critical 
threshold of 2.00), indicating strong serial correlation in the error term and 
perhaps, therefore, the mis-specification of the model.25  
The latter segments of Table 5 replicate the regressions on the two 
alternative sample periods.  Applying the Layne-Farrar model to the full data 
period (from 1984 through to 2008) leads to a reduction in the estimated size of 
the unionization coefficient (which now ranges from 0.19 to 0.27).  This would 
affect the estimated absolute unemployment effects calculated in Layne-Farrar’s 
counter-factual simulations, but does not affect the qualitative direction of those 
findings.  In the longer sample period, lagged consumer prices are now 
significant.  For the post-splice data period (beginning in 1998) the unionization 
coefficient is smaller still (ranging from 0.13 to 0.23), but again still significant.  
We are thus able to re-create Layne-Farrar’s findings for the unemployment rate 
using a levels regression of pooled cross-sectional time-series levels data. 
 
II. FIRST DIFFERENCE REGRESSIONS OF THE LAYNE-FARRAR SPECIFICATION 
 
Now we test the sensitivity of Layne-Farrar’s findings to the crucial 
problem of non-stationarity in all her variables that was identified above.  These 
results are reported in Table 6.  Again we have applied exactly the same 
specification as Layne-Farrar reported in her Table 3, but converted into first-
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difference format to eliminate the problem of non-stationarity in both the 
dependent and the independent variables.26  (By converting to first-difference 
form, the control variables now consist only of the lagged changes in GDP and 
lagged change in consumer prices; the former lagged level of GDP, converted to 
first-difference form, is redundant with the lagged change in GDP which was 
already included in her levels regressions.)  In the first-difference regressions on 
the initial (1984-1995) sample period, the unionization variable is significant only 
with the random effects estimator (the appropriateness of which, in this context, 
was questioned above).  Unionization is not significant in the OLS or fixed effects 
estimations.  Applied to the full sample period, the unionization variable is 
found to be weakly significant in the OLS and random effects variants, but not in 
the fixed effects estimation.  For the post-splice period (1999 through 2008) the 
unionization variable is not significant in any case.  Across all of these 
regressions, the coefficient on unionization is much smaller than in the levels 
regressions (ranging from 0.06 through 0.12, and not statistically significant in 
most cases).  The adjusted R2 scores for the first-differenced regressions are also 
much lower than in the levels regressions.  Applying the Layne-Farrar model to 
(stationary) first-differenced data is seen therefore to result in smaller 
coefficients, very weak and inconsistent statistical significance, and greatly 
reduced explanatory power. 
 
III. COMPLETE SPECIFICATION 
 
Finally, we now consider a more complete model of the Canadian 
unemployment rate, appropriately specified in first-difference terms, and taking 
into account the full range of macroeconomic and structural factors discussed 
above.  These regressions are reported in Table 7, once again utilizing the same 
three estimators utilized by Layne-Farrar (OLS, fixed effects, and random 
effects).  We preserve the same variables utilized in the Layne-Farrar regressions: 
lagged unionization, once- and twice-lagged changes in GDP, and lagged 
changes in consumer prices.  We include a set of additional macroeconomic and 
structural factors, in line with the discussion in Section 3 above, including: 
changes in interest rates and credit conditions, changes in oil and other 
commodity prices, and changes in export demand.  To save space (given the 
longer list of right-hand-side variables included here), the fully-specified 
regression results are reported only for the full sample period (1984 through 
2008).27  The random effects results are reported in two different columns, C and 
D, for the following reason: in a random effects regression the number of 
coefficients cannot exceed the number of cross-sections in the pooled data set (in 
this case, ten), and hence one of the right-hand-side variables had to be dropped.  
It is most appropriate to drop any non-significant variables (in this case, 
unionization, as was done in column D); however, to confirm that the non-
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significance of unionization is maintained throughout, we also dropped one of 
the less significant other explanatory variables (the oil price) in column C.  In the 
fully-specified first-difference equation, the unionization coefficient is near-zero 
and statistically insignificant in every single formulation. 
Our re-creation of Layne-Farrar’s model of the Canadian unemployment 
rate confirms that the significant positive relationship she reported between the 
unemployment rate and lagged unionization is entirely dependent on her use of 
time-trended (ie. non-stationary) variables, and her exclusion of the broader 
macroeconomic and structural variables that are important to Canadian labour 
market performance.  Layne-Farrar’s results collapse when the model is 
corrected for non-stationarity in both its dependent and independent variables, 
and when the full range of macroeconomic and structural factors explaining 
Canadian labour market performance is incorporated into the analysis. 
 
(B) EMPLOYMENT RATE REGRESSIONS 
 
I. RE-CREATING THE LAYNE-FARRAR RESULTS (LEVELS)                                            
 
This section performs the same exercise to re-create Layne-Farrar’s 
reported findings for the employment rate,28 and then to test their sensitivity to 
the non-stationarity of included variables and the exclusion of other relevant 
explanatory variables.  Table 8 re-creates Layne-Farrar’s findings, in level terms, 
from her Table 4.  We utilize her same specification: the employment rate is 
dependent on lagged unionization, lagged GDP per capita, and once- and twice-
lagged changes in GDP per capita.  The top panel of the table reports regression 
results for the true original data from the sample period she considered (1984 
through 1995); the latter panels report results for the complete sample period 
(1984 through 2008) and the post-splice sample period (1998 through 2008).  The 
top panel indicates that we are indeed able to re-create Layne-Farrar’s findings 
using our own pooled cross-section time-series set of provincial data.  In the 
initial time period (1984 through 1995), lagged unionization is seen to be a 
consistently significant, important, and negative determinant of the employment 
rate.  The attained coefficients vary from -0.36 to -0.43.  Once again, these are 
substantially larger (in absolute terms) than the coefficients reported in Layne-
Farrar’s Table 4 (which ranged from -0.17 to -0.23).  Lagged GDP per capita is a 
strongly significant control variable (not surprisingly, considering that its secular 
rising trend mirrors the long secular rise in women’s labour force participation 
which has clearly been important to Canada’s rising employment rate over time).  
Lagged changes in GDP per capita are not generally significant (also consistent 
with Layne-Farrar’s Table 4 results). 
Over the full sample period (1984 through 2008), the absolute size of the 
unionization coefficient diminishes (now equaling -0.13 for the fixed effect and 
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random effect regressions, but a much larger -0.33 for the OLS regressions), but 
the results are otherwise qualitatively similar.  In the post-splice sample period 
(1998 through 2008), the unionization variable is not significant with any of the 
estimators (and in fact becomes positively signed, contrary to expectation, in the 
fixed effects and random effects estimations).  This suggests that even in the 
levels regressions, both the size and the significance of the unionization 
coefficient in explaining the employment rate are very sensitive to the sample 
period and estimator considered.  This should give immediate caution to 
interpreting Layne-Farrar’s coefficients in such a precise, quantitative manner as 
she does with her numerical simulations of the impact of labour law changes on 
U.S. employment performance. 
 
II. FIRST DIFFERENCE REGRESSIONS OF THE LAYNE-FARRAR SPECIFICATION 
 
Table 9 reports the results of the same Layne-Farrar specification of the 
employment rate model, converted into first-difference terms.  Now the change 
in the employment rate is regressed on the lagged change in unionization and 
the once- and twice-lagged changes in GDP per capita.  This time the 
unionization variable is significant (at the 95% level) even in the first-differenced 
equation for the initial time period (1984 through 1995).  The first lag of change in 
GDP per capita is strongly significant.  Over the longer sample period, the 
unionization variable is significant in all formulations at the 99% level.  In both 
cases, the size of the unionization coefficient is much smaller than in the levels 
regression: about 0.10 in all formulations.  In the latter post-splice data period 
(1999 through 2008), the unionization coefficient falls to near zero and is 
insignificant.  These results, therefore, are inconclusive: the unionization 
coefficient is significant but smaller in the longer sample periods; its significance 
disappears in the latter sample period (since 1998).  Now we will consider 
whether this weaker support for the Layne-Farrar hypothesis that unionization 
reduces the employment rate is sustained in the context of a more complete 
specification of the determinants of employment. 
 
III. COMPLETE SPECIFICATION 
 
In addition to the various macroeconomic and structural variables which 
we incorporated into our complete unemployment rate model above, the Layne-
Farrar employment rate regressions also omit what is the most obvious cause of 
the long-run secular trend in that dependent variable – namely, the secular rise 
in women’s labour force participation.  Table 10, therefore, reports the results of 
the estimation of what we consider a more convincing and complete model of the 
Canadian employment rate.  It includes lagged changes in female labour 
participation.  It considers the same macroeconomic variables that were included 
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in the unemployment model (lagged credit, consumer prices, and commodity 
prices).  After including female labour force participation, the long-run growth in 
GDP per capita is no longer significant as a determinant of the employment rate.  
However, changes in GDP itself are significant as an indicator of cyclical 
macroeconomic conditions. 
After considering this broader set of explanatory variables, and in 
particular the crucial effect of female labour force participation, unionization 
loses all of its significance as a determinant of the employment rate.  The 
coefficient on unionization is near-zero and statistically insignificant in all three 
formulations presented in Table 10.29  Increases in female labour force 
participation are a consistent and strongly significant determinant of the rise in 
the employment rate.  The other macroeconomic and structural variables are also 
all strongly significant in every formulation. 
These results demonstrate conclusively that the negative correlation 
reported by Layne-Farrar between unionization and the employment rate is 
entirely due to an inappropriate, spurious correlation between the secular time 
trends in those two variables.  When a full account is taken of the underlying 
demographic factors driving changes in the employment rate (especially the 
obvious influence of women’s changing labour force participation), the 
significance of unionization disappears entirely. 
In sum, then, the results reported by Layne-Farrar in her Tables 3 and 4 
(and which provided the empirical basis for her sensational claims regarding the 
destructive impact of proposed labour law changes on U.S. labour market 
performance) are based on an inappropriate and incomplete methodology.  After 
correcting for non-stationarity in all of her included variables, and correctly 
specifying more complete models of labour market outcomes (incorporating the 
obvious impact of macroeconomic, structural, and demographic determinants), 
there is no evidence whatsoever that unionization has caused either higher 
unemployment rates or lower employment rates in Canada.  Any attempts to 
extrapolate that faulty conclusion, based on a deep misunderstanding of how 
Canadian labour markets actually function, to the experience of other countries 
(and to the U.S. in particular) is both illegitimate and unconvincing. 
 
7. PRELIMINARY REGRESSIONS UTILIZING U.S. DATA 
 
The whole notion that an estimate of the potential impact of labour law 
legislation in the U.S. should be simulated on the basis of econometric estimates 
fitted to Canadian data is inherently counter-intuitive.  Why not conduct this 
research using empirical data from the U.S. labour market – which is, after all, 
the jurisdiction where the proposed policy changes are being considered?  
Nominally, Layne-Farrar justifies the “Canadian connection” on the basis of a 
“natural experiment” associated with inter-provincial variation in labour 
57   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society – V.15 – Special Edition – Nov. 09 
  
legislation in Canada.  But as we have seen, her analysis in no way considers that 
inter-provincial variation in legislation.  It considers only inter-provincial 
variation in unionization, which is entirely distinct.  Moreover, inter-jurisdictional 
variation in unionization rates would allow her experiment to be conducted on 
any other cross-sectional sample – including, most obviously, the U.S. 
Is the Layne-Farra hypothesis that unionization causes higher 
unemployment rates, and lower employment rates, supported by the empirical 
evidence from her own country?  It is beyond the scope of the present paper to 
conduct a full-fledged analysis of pooled cross-sectional time-series data for the 
50 U.S. states (plus the District of Columbia) that would be truly comparable to 
Layne-Farrar’s Canadian analysis; that would be a daunting (but interesting) 
analytical project in its own right.  However, we can conduct some preliminary 
tests on two different (and simpler) forms of U.S. data: time-series data for the 
U.S. economy as a whole, and a point-in-time cross-sectional analysis of inter-
state variation in unionization and labour market performance (for 2008).  This 
section presents the results of those preliminary tests.  We find that the evidence 
for the claim that unionization increases unemployment and reduces 
employment is even weaker in the U.S. data, than it is in the Canadian data.30 
 
(A) NATIONAL TIME-SERIES UNEMPLOYMENT RATE REGRESSIONS  
 
Table 11 provides the results from two simple applications of the Layne-
Farrar hypothesis regarding the unemployment rate (as reported in her Table 3, 
where the unemployment rate is dependent on lagged unionization, once- and 
twice-lagged changes in GDP, and lagged consumer prices) to aggregate time 
series data for the U.S. economy as a whole.  Even in the levels regression (which 
would be inappropriate anyway, given the likely non-stationarity of the U.S. data 
on unemployment, unionization, GDP, and inflation), unionization is not found 
to be a significant determinant of the U.S. unemployment rate (Column A).  In a 
more appropriate first-differenced formulation (Column B), the unionization rate 
is again not statistically significant. Lagged changes in GDP are significant in 
both formulations; lagged consumer prices are significant in the first-differenced 
regression only.  A more thorough investigation would be required to construct a 
complete behavioural specification for the U.S. unemployment rate (which 
would presumably incorporate a broader set of macroeconomic, structural, and 
demographic factors similar to those utilized in the complete Canadian 
regressions reported above).  But the evidence already indicates that 
unionization is not a significant determinant of the U.S. unemployment rate. 
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(B) NATIONAL TIME-SERIES EMPLOYMENT RATE REGRESSIONS 
 
Table 12 reports the results of a similar exercise conducted utilizing 
aggregate national-level U.S. data on the employment rate and its potential 
determinants.  Again, the same specification reported in Layne-Farrar’s Table 4 is 
applied to the U.S. data (relating the employment rate to lagged unionization, 
lagged GDP per capita, and once- and twice-lagged changes in GDP per capita).  
This time the levels regression (Column A) seems to indicate a significant 
negative impact of unionization on the employment rate (with an estimated 
coefficient much larger in absolute terms than those reported by Layne-Farrar, 
equal to -0.56).  Lagged changes in GDP per capita are also significant, and the 
simple equation attains a high adjusted R2 value of 0.788.  Again, however, the 
correlation is spurious, based on the secular time trend readily visible in both the 
U.S. unionization rate (which has steadily declined) and the U.S. employment 
rate (which has steadily increased, driven fundamentally, as in Canada, by the 
increase in female labour force participation).  By correcting for the non-
stationarity of the variables and conducting the regression in first-difference 
terms, the unionization variable loses significance entirely (Column B).  Once 
again, in a more complete specification (which considers macroeconomic and 
demographic factors), the non-importance of unionization in explaining the U.S. 
employment rate would be confirmed. 
 
(C) SIMPLE CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS 
 
Another simple approach is to consider variation in unionization across 
the U.S. states at a point in time, to see if there is any immediate cross-sectional 
support for the claim that unionization causes higher unemployment and lower 
employment.  We assembled data on unemployment and employment rates for 
all 50 states plus the District of Columbia for 2008.  We also assembled data 
(lagged one year to avoid simultaneity problems) for unionization and three key 
additional explanatory variables: change in real GDP, inflation, and female 
labour force participation (the latter for the employment rate regression).  Results 
are reported in Table 13. 
A straight regression of the unemployment rate on lagged unionization 
(Column A) indicates a weakly significant correlation between higher 
unionization and higher unemployment.  The coefficient on unionization in this 
simplest regression (0.06) is about one-fifth as large as the coefficients which 
Layne-Farrar reports in her Table 3.  Moreover, simply including the two most 
obvious state-level macroeconomic indicators (change in GDP and inflation) 
causes an entire loss of significance for the unionization variable, strong 
significance for the macroeconomic variables, and a dramatic improvement in 
the explanatory power of the equation (Column B).  After accounting for 
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macroeconomic conditions, therefore, unionization has no significance in 
explaining cross-state variation in U.S. unemployment rates. 
In the case of the employment rate, the results are even weaker for the 
Layne-Farrar hypothesis.  In this case there is no support for even a simple 
correlation between the employment rate and lagged unionization (Column C).  
Macroeconomic conditions (GDP growth) and demographic factors (female 
labour force participation) can explain over 85 percent of cross-state variation in 
employment rates, even in this simple behavioural formulation (Column D).  
There is no evidence whatsoever that state-level employment rates depend on 
unionization. 
In summary, neither national time-series data nor state-level cross-
sectional analysis seems to provide any initial support for the claim that 
unionization causes higher unemployment rates and lower employment rates in 
the U.S. context.  Considering that this is a U.S. policy debate, examining the U.S. 
data (rather than Canadian data) would have seemed the logical place to begin. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
There is a substantial international literature on the impact of labour 
market and social institutions on relative labour market performance.  Some 
recent installments in that literature include OECD (2006), Howell (2005), and 
Hein, Heise and Truger (2006).  The OECD 2006 report, in particular, provides a 
very comprehensive and complete review of the empirical evidence regarding 
the impact of labour market and social institutions (including unions and 
collective bargaining coverage, along with other institutional variables like 
unemployment insurance and employment protection laws) on aggregate labour 
market performance, adjusting for macroeconomic conditions and other 
explanatory factors.  It concludes explicitly that “the effects of trade-unions and 
employment protection legislation [on unemployment] are statistically 
insignificant” (p. 212).  Moreover, the OECD study finds that the degree of 
centralization of collective bargaining is negatively associated with 
unemployment rates (suggesting that European-style co-determination 
arrangements can be very effective in combining extensive collective bargaining 
with very low unemployment).  Coming from the same international institution 
which once advocated wholesale labour market deregulation as the solution to 
all unemployment ailments, these findings are extraordinary. 
This evidence has not stopped anti-union researchers from seeking an 
empirical “smoking gun” to support their inherent opposition to legislative 
changes which might arrest or even reverse the long-term decline in union 
membership in the U.S. and other industrial countries.  The Canadian 
experience, however, provides no such “smoking gun.”  After correctly 
specifying the econometric methodology (in particular, by ensuring that 
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included variables do not exhibit secular trends over time), and considering the 
impact of all determinants of unemployment and employment performance (in 
the Canadian case by including variables reflecting monetary policy, exchange 
rate and terms of trade issues, commodity prices, and demographic trends), there 
is no statistically significant relationship visible, in either direction, between 
unionization and either unemployment rates or employment rates in Canada.  
Unionization is not a significant determinant of aggregate Canadian labour 
market performance.  Layne-Farrar’s results were based on an inappropriate 
methodology: her regressions on non-stationary series, and her exclusion of 
important explanatory variables.  Preliminary analysis indicates that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between unionization and either the 
unemployment rate or the employment rate visible in the U.S. data, either. 
These findings are consistent with the international literature which finds 
that macroeconomic policy and conditions are the dominant determinants of 
labour market performance.  Stronger collective bargaining structures can be 
associated with either weak or strong labour market performance, depending on 
the state of the other, more important determinants of unemployment and 
employment (such as macroeconomic and demographic factors). 
The Layne-Farrar prediction that passage of the Employee Free Choice Act 
would lead to an increase in U.S. unemployment of up to 5 million people is a 
sensational and seemingly precise numerical claim that has captured 
considerable attention in the U.S. debate over proposed labour law changes.  But 
that claim has no credible empirical basis: it is rooted in an unrealistic and 
internally inconsistent numerical extrapolation to the U.S. context of econometric 
findings that were inappropriately estimated on the basis of Canadian data 
which did not even incorporate the link between labour legislation and labour 
market performance which Layne-Farrar purports to address in the first place.  
Those sensational predictions should not be considered as credible reflections of 
Canada’s historical labour market experience. 
Here is an alternative way of summarizing (in a simple numerical “take-
away”) the crucial comparisons between the Canadian and U.S. labour markets.  
The international economic literature finds consistently that there is no 
systematic link between unionization and key indicators of labour market 
performance (such as unemployment and employment).  So Canada’s stronger 
pattern of unionization and collective bargaining will not likely explain any 
differences between the aggregate performance of the Canadian and U.S. labour 
markets.  However, taken as a whole, the complex of Canadian macroeconomic 
and institutional policies and factors has created a labour market which has 
performed consistently better than the U.S. labour market in recent years, 
demonstrating stronger job-creation and employment rates, lower 
unemployment, and less wage and income inequality.  Based on 2008 data, if 
America’s labour market had been performing as well as Canada’s (stronger 
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unions and all), about 3.3 million more Americans would be employed, 
unemployment would fall by over 750,000 (or about one-tenth), and an 
additional 2.5 million Americans would be participating in the labour force.31  
Better yet, over 5 percent of American households (or 6.5 million households in 
total) would be lifted out of poverty.32 
Especially during this moment of profound economic crisis and very high 
unemployment, the de-unionizing U.S. labour market can hardly be held up as a 
model of an “efficient” market outcome (never mind the human and social 
consequences of the widespread poverty and inequality that are a clear and 
longer-lasting consequence of the weaker collective bargaining structures, and 
the more laissez-faire approach to labour market and social policy in general, that 
exist in the U.S.).  Indeed, a plausible connection could be made between the 
current crisis and the underlying inequality of U.S. labour market outcomes.  
Consider, for example, the extent to which unsustainable mortgage lending 
practices may have reflected the economic desperation felt by many U.S. 
households reaching for a better life despite their low earnings.  In this context, 
the claim that American policy-makers should beware the Canadian experience 
in formulating their own labour relations legislation seems strongly counter-
intuitive.  Unionization alone is not likely to improve or detract from aggregate 
labour market performance, based on the international and Canadian data.  
However, as part of an overall package of economic and social policies aimed at 
promoting economic growth and efficiency, simultaneously with greater social 
equality and inclusion, unionization can be reasonably considered as a positive 
feature of a more economically sustainable policy framework.  In other words, 
unionization could help Americans attain better, more sustainable, and more 
socially inclusive labour market outcomes – rather than leading to massive 
unemployment and job loss as predicted by Layne-Farrar. 
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APPENDIX A:  
TABLES 
 
Table 1: 
Tests for Unit Root (Non-Stationarity) of Variables Included in Layne-Farrar Regressions 
Province 
Levels First Differences 
UE ER UZ GDP 
GDP/ 
CAP 
CPI UE ER UZ GDP 
GDP/ 
CAP 
CPI 
AB Not Not Not Not Not 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 
BC Not Not Not Not Not Not 95% 99% Not 99% 99% 99% 
MN Not Not Not Not Not Not 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 
NB Not Not Not Not Not 99% 99% 99% 95% 99% 95% 99% 
NF Not Not Not Not Not Not 99% 95% Not 99% 99% 99% 
NS Not Not Not Not Not Not 99% 99% Not Not Not 99% 
ON 95% 95% Not Not Not 99% 99% 95% 99% 95% 95% 99% 
PE Not Not Not Not Not Not 99% 99% Not 99% 99% 99% 
QU Not Not Not Not Not Not 99% 99% Not 99% 99% 99% 
SK Not Not 95% Not Not 99% 99% 99% 95% 99% 99% 99% 
Summary 
of 
Provincial 
Totals 
9 Not 
1 95% 
9 Not 
1 95% 
9 Not 
1 95% 
10 Not 10 Not 
6 Not 
4 99% 
1 95% 
9 99% 
2 95% 
8 99% 
5 Not 
2 95% 
3 99% 
1 Not 
1 95% 
8 99% 
1 Not 
2 95% 
7 99% 
10 
99% 
National 
Canadian 
Data 
Not Not Not Not Not Not 99% 95% 95% 95% 99% 99% 
Contents of each cell indicate whether hypothesis of unit root can be rejected at the 99% level of significance, the 95% level of 
significance, or cannot be rejected. Unit roots tests utilize Augmented Dickey-Fuller methodology with intercept included. 
Variable codes: UE=unemployment rate; ER=employment rate; UZ=union density; GDP=real GDP; GDP/cap=real GDP per 
capita; CPI=change in consumer price index. 
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Table 2: 
Spurious Regressions of Non-Stationary Variables 
 A. B. C. D. E. 
 
Core Layne-
Farrar Theorem: 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Other Spurious Regressions 
Taxes Paid 
by Non-
Residents 
Capital 
Consumption 
Consumer 
Credit 
CPI Sub-
Index: 
Alcohol & 
Tobacco 
Products 
Constant 
-7.184 
(5.006) 
8197.8* 
(3220.5) 
-58683.0 
(43439.5) 
328828.2* 
(135514.9) 
-85.210* 
(36.852) 
Identical Vector of Independent Variables: 
Lagged Union 
Density 
0.6095** 
(0.1326) 
-771.77** 
(85.29) 
-14090.7** 
(1150.4) 
-39077.9** 
(3588.9) 
-7.742** 
(0.9760) 
Lagged 
Changes 
in GDP: 
     
One Lag 
-3.50E-11** 
(1.18 E-11) 
2.56E-9 
(7.57E-09) 
5.94E-8 
(1.02E-07) 
1.70E-9 
(3.18E-07) 
-1.97E-10* 
(8.66E-11) 
Two Lags 
-2.17E-11 
(1.25 E-11) 
-1.10E-9 
(8.03E-09) 
-1.22E-7 
(1.08E-07) 
-5.42E-7 
(3.38E-07) 
-1.90E-10* 
(9.19E-11) 
Lagged Log 
CPI 
-0.7937 
(0.6083) 
-4777.9** 
(391.3) 
148368** 
(5278.5) 
266327.7** 
(16467.1) 
98.9823** 
(4.4780) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
Adjusted R2 .725 .911 .975 .939 .953 
Durbin-
Watson 
1.102 1.206 1.271 0.972 0.895 
* Significant at 95% level.  ** Significant at 99% level.  Sample 1976 – 2008 (with endpoints adjusted 
for lags, 1979 – 2008). OLS regressions.  Standard errors of estimates in brackets.  See appendix for 
definitions and sources of data. 
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Table 3: 
Unemployment Rate Regressions, Aggregate Canadian National Data 
A. B. C. 
Levels 
1st Differences, 
Unchanged 
1st Differences, 
Complete Model 
Dependent 
Variable 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Dependent 
Variable 
Change in 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Dependent 
Variable 
Change in 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Constant 
-7.184 
(5.006) 
Constant 
-0.4674 
(.4813) 
Constant 
.8453* 
(0.3080) 
Unionization 
One lag 
0.6095** 
(0.1326) 
Change in 
Unionizati
on 
One lag 
0.2330 
(0.2716) 
Change in 
Unionization 
One lag 
-0.0417 
(0.1701) 
Change in GDP 
One lag 
 
Two lags 
 
 
 
-3.50E-11** 
(1.18E-11) 
-2.17E-11 
(1.25E-11) 
Change in 
GDP 
One lag 
 
Two lags 
 
 
 
-1.63E-11 
(1.21E-11) 
1.35E-11 
(1.05E-11) 
Change in 
GDP 
One lag 
 
Two lags 
 
Not significant 
Log CPI 
One lag 
 
-0.7937 
(0.6083) 
Change in 
Log CPI 
One lag 
11.988 
(6.074) 
Change in Log 
CPI 
One lag 
17.577** 
(4.256) 
 
Change in 
Interest Rate 
One lag 
0.1761** 
(0.0496) 
Change in 
Exports 
One lag 
-2.20E-05* 
(8.13E-06) 
Change Log 
Commodity 
Prices 
-3.697** 
(1.177) 
Change Log 
Consumer 
Credit 
-15.133** 
(3.285) 
Observations 30 Observations 30 Observations 31 
Adjusted R2 0.725 Adjusted R2 0.269 Adjusted R2 0.726 
Durbin- 
Watson 
1.102 
Durbin-
Watson 
1.739 
Durbin-
Watson 
1.356 
Dependent variable is the unemployment rate.  *Significant at 95% level. **Significant at 99% level. Sample 
1976 – 2008 (with endpoints adjusted for lags, 1979 – 2008).  OLS regressions. Standard errors of estimates in 
brackets. 
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Table 4: 
Employment Rate Regressions, Aggregate Canadian National Data 
A. B. C. 
Levels 
1st Differences, 
Unchanged 
1st Differences, 
Complete Model 
Dependent 
Variable 
Employment 
Rate 
Dependent 
Variable 
Change in 
Employment 
Rate 
Dependent 
Variable 
Change in 
Employment 
Rate 
Constant 
-59.760** 
(6.437) 
Constant 
-0.1349 
(0.2426) 
Constant 
-1.4215** 
(0.2894) 
Unionization 
One lag 
-0.2442 
(0.1645) 
Change in 
Unionization 
One lag 
-0.2272 
(0.2631) 
Change in 
Unionization 
One lag 
-0.1871 
(0.1479) 
GDP per 
Capita 
One lag 
 
 
2.68E-4** 
(5.00E-5) 
GDP per 
Capita 
One lag 
Redundant 
with below 
GDP per 
Capita 
One lag 
Not 
significant 
Change in 
GDP per 
Capita 
One lag 
 
Two lags 
 
 
 
 
2.90E-4 
(3.67E-4) 
4.89E-4 
(3.88E-4) 
Change in 
GDP per 
Capita 
One lag 
 
Two lags 
 
 
 
 
6.22E-4 
(3.06E-4) 
-9.88E-6 
(2.92E-4) 
Change in 
GDP 
One lag 
 
 
 
2.88E-11** 
(6.58E-12) 
 
Change in 
Female 
Participation 
Rate 
One lag 
 
 
 
0.6286** 
(0.2116) 
Change in 
Interest Rate 
One lag 
 
-0.2329** 
(0.0502) 
Change in 
Log Oil Price 
One lag 
 
-0.9685* 
(0.4717) 
Change Log 
Consumer 
Credit 
7.513* 
(3.403) 
Observations 30 Observations 30 Observations 31 
Adjusted R2 0.700 Adjusted R2 0.168 Adjusted R2 0.736 
Durbin-
Watson 
0.661 
Durbin-
Watson 
1.922 
Durbin-
Watson 
2.186 
Dependent variable is the employment rate.  *Significant at 95% level. **Significant at 99% level. 
Sample 1976 – 2008 (with endpoints adjusted for lags, 1979 – 2008).  OLS regressions. Standard 
errors of estimates in brackets. 
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Table 5: 
Re-Creating Layne-Farrar Regressions 
Unemployment Rate Level, Canadian Pooled Data 
 A. B. C. 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Adjusted Initial Layne-Farrar Sample Period (1984-1995) 
Constant 
-0.189 
(7.835) 
Province-specific 
1.1830 
(4.0564) 
Unionization 
One lag 
0.2990** 
(0.0334) 
0.4714** 
(0.0620) 
0.4099** 
(0.0519) 
Change in GDP 
One lag 
 
Two lags 
 
 
-1.33E-10* 
(6.59E-11) 
-1.64E-10* 
(6.78E-11) 
 
-6.91E-11* 
(3.22E-11) 
-1.31E-10** 
(2.97E-11) 
 
-7.46E-11* 
(3.33E-11) 
-1.35E-10** 
(3.08E-11) 
Log CPI 
One lag 
0.2667 
(1.8300) 
-1.0545 
(0.7926) 
-1.038 
(0.824) 
Observations 120 120 120 
Adjusted R2 0.500 0.909 0.901* 
Durbin-Watson 0.179 1.154 0.907* 
Full Sample Period (1984-2008) 
Constant 
18.563** 
(4.909) 
Province-specific 
22.668** 
(2.8288) 
Unionization 
One lag 
0.2715** 
(0.0302) 
0.1892** 
(0.0281) 
0.2015** 
(0.0280) 
Change in GDP 
One lag 
Two lags 
 
-1.38E-10* 
(5.60E-11) 
-9.66E-11 
(5.55E-11) 
 
-1.02E-10** 
(2.68E-11) 
-7.21E-11** 
(2.47E-11) 
 
-1.05E-10** 
(2.81E-11) 
-7.42E-11* 
(2.59E-11) 
Log CPI 
One lag 
-3.9262** 
(1.0392) 
-5.3683** 
(0.4828) 
-5.2363** 
(0.5033) 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.897 0.885† 
Durbin-Watson 0.090 0.458 0.400† 
Post-Data Splice Sample Period (1998-2008) 
Constant 
50.364* 
(19.748) 
Province-specific 
47.742** 
(5.591) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
0.1334* 
(0.0626) 
0.2254** 
(0.0728) 
0.2182** 
(0.0690) 
Change in GDP 
  One lag 
  Two lags 
 
-1.44E-10 
(9.40E-11) 
-6.45E-11 
(9.44E-11) 
 
-8.91E-11** 
(2.25E-11) 
-1.17E-11 
(-1.17E-11) 
 
-9.01E-11** 
(2.23E-11) 
-1.24E-11 
(2.02E-11) 
Log CPI 
  One lag 
-9.9194* 
(4.2172) 
-9.9927** 
(0.8932) 
-10.0354** 
(0.880) 
Observations 110 110 110 
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.971 0.971† 
Durbin-Watson 0.046 1.212 1.117† 
Dependent variable is the change in the unemployment rate. 
Post-data-splice sample begins in 1998 for levels, 1999 for first-differences. 
*Significant at 95% level. **Significant at 99% level. Pooled regressions across 10 
Canadian provinces.  Standard errors of estimates in brackets. 
† Adj. R2 and D-W of GLS transformed regression. 
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Table 6:  
First Difference Regressions of Layne-Farrar Specification 
Unemployment Rate, Canadian Pooled Data 
 A. B. C. 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Adjusted Initial Layne-Farrar Sample Period (1984-1995) 
Constant 
-0.7728** 
(0.1949) 
Province-specific 
-0.7169** 
(0.1861) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
0.0684 
(0.0422) 
0.0556 
(0.0431) 
0.1217** 
(0.0437) 
Change in GDP 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
-8.82E-11** 
(2.19E-11) 
4.09E-11 
(2.29E-11) 
 
-1.07E-10** 
(2.52E-11) 
3.29E-11 
(2.36E-11) 
 
-6.98E-11** 
(2.01E-11) 
5.239E-11* 
(2.46E-11) 
Change in Log CPI 
  One lag 
20.1345** 
(4.8933) 
20.4574** 
(4.9948) 
16.7121** 
(5.1436) 
Observations 120 120 120 
Adjusted R2 0.277 0.264 0.133† 
Durbin-Watson 1.500 1.649 1.284† 
Full Sample Period (1984-2008) 
Constant 
-0.6115** 
(0.1079) 
Province-specific 
-0.6145** 
(0.0951) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
0.0593* 
(0.0298) 
0.0575 
(0.0304) 
0.0639* 
(0.0293) 
Change in GDP 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
-6.26E-11** 
(1.39E-11) 
5.23E-11** 
(1.37E-11) 
 
-7.06E-11** 
(1.63E-11) 
4.73E-11* 
(1.46E-11) 
 
-5.95E-11** 
(1.30E-11) 
5.62E-11** 
(1.37E-11) 
Change in Log CPI 
  One lag 
15.5935** 
(3.2387) 
15.3221** 
(3.3072) 
15.0482** 
(3.2850) 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R2 0.193 0.175 0.139† 
Durbin-Watson 1.737 1.781 1.165† 
Post-Data Splice Sample Period (1999-2008) 
Constant 
-0.6349** 
(0.1583) 
Province-specific 
-0.6166** 
(0.1301) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
0.1003 
(0.0734) 
0.0921 
(0.0774) 
0.1222 
(0.0728) 
Change in GDP 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
-2.64E-11 
(1.88E-11) 
3.92E-11* 
(1.82E-11) 
 
-2.40E-11 
(2.24E-11) 
4.17E-11 
(2.26E-11) 
 
-2.69E-11 
(1.88E-11) 
3.91E-11* 
(1.81E-11) 
Change in Log CPI 
  One lag 
15.3470* 
(6.7310) 
15.5134* 
(7.5647) 
14.7686* 
(5.8300) 
Observations 100 100 100 
Adjusted R2 0.100 0.030 0.039† 
Durbin-Watson 2.359 2.404 2.227† 
Dependent variable is the change in the employment rate. 
*Significant at 95% level. **Significant at 99% level. Pooled regressions across 10 
Canadian provinces.  Standard errors of parameter estimates in brackets. 
† Adj. R2 and D-W of GLS transformed regression. 
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Table 7: 
Complete First Difference Specification 
Unemployment Rate, Canadian Pooled Data 
 A. B. C. D. 
 OLS Fixed Effects 
Random Effects 
(no oil price)¦ 
Random Effects 
(no unionization )¦ 
Constant 
0.3857* 
(0.1732) 
Province-specific 
0.4799** 
(0.1703) 
0.3852* 
(0.1788) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
0.0143 
(0.0264) 
-0.0124 
(0.0269) 
0.0274 
(0.0261) 
-- 
Change in GDP 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
-4.30E-11** 
(1.23E-11) 
3.58E-11** 
(1.21E-11) 
 
-4.74E-11** 
(1.44E-11) 
3.27E-11* 
(1.30E-11) 
 
-4.38E-11** 
(1.24E-11) 
3.71E-11** 
(1.22E-11) 
 
-4.45E-11** 
(1.29E-11) 
3.45E-11** 
(1.23E-11) 
Change in Log 
CPI 
  One lag 
 
16.605** 
(3.206) 
 
16.656** 
(3.254) 
 
15.406** 
(3.195) 
 
17.124** 
(3.056) 
Change in 
Interest Rate 
  One lag 
 
0.0671* 
(0.0267) 
 
0.0699* 
(0.0272) 
 
0.0852** 
(0.0258) 
 
0.0677* 
(0.0266) 
Change in Log 
Total Credit 
-10.724** 
(1.185) 
-10.644** 
(1.842) 
-11.402** 
(1.809) 
-10.843** 
(1.784) 
Change in Log 
Oil Prices 
0.5444* 
(0.2312) 
0.5520* 
(0.2336) 
-- 
0.5725* 
(0.2244) 
Change in Log 
Commodity 
Prices 
-3.220** 
(0.5261) 
-3.214** 
(0.5314) 
-2.864** 
(0.5086) 
-3.224** 
(0.5224) 
Change in Exports 
  One lag 
 
-1.26E-5** 
(3.33E-6) 
 
-1.24E-5** 
(3.38E-6) 
 
-1.21E-5** 
(3.35E-6) 
 
-1.27E-5** 
(3.31E-6) 
Observations 250 250 250 250 
Adjusted R2 0.419 0.407 0.408† 0.427† 
Durbin-Watson 1.915 1.962 1.906† 1.928† 
Dependent variable is the change in the unemployment rate. 
*Significant at 95% level. **Significant at 99% level. Pooled regressions across 10 Canadian provinces.  Full 
sample period 1984-2008 (adjusted for endpoints of data). Standard errors of parameter estimates in 
brackets. 
¦ Random effects model could not be estimated for the complete specification reported in columns A and 
B, because in a RE regression the total number of estimated coefficients cannot exceed the number of 
cross-sections in the pooled data set.  In column C the least significant variable in columns A and B other 
than the unionization variable was dropped (oil prices), in order to demonstrate that the unionization 
variable remains insignificant.  In column D, the unionization variable (which was not significant in any 
of the complete specifications) was dropped. 
† Adj. R2 and D-W of GLS transformed regression. 
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Table 8: 
Re-Creating Layne-Farrar Regressions 
Employment Rate Level, Canadian Pooled Data 
 A. B. C. 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Adjusted Initial Layne-Farrar Sample Period (1984-1995) 
Constant 
51.529** 
(2.451) 
Province-specific 
62.117** 
(3.155) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
-0.3632** 
(0.0402) 
-0.4101** 
(0.0710) 
-0.4291** 
0.0623) 
GDP per Capita 
  One lag 
7.34E-4** 
(5.35E-5) 
3.39E-4** 
(7.18E-5) 
4.07E-4** 
(6.73E-5) 
Change in GDP per 
Capita 
  One lag 
  Two lags 
-2.36E-5 
(3.25E-4) 
 
-3.72E-5 
(2.97E-4) 
4.62E-5 
(1.50E-4) 
 
2.86E-4* 
(1.44E-4) 
3.72E-5 
(1.53E-4) 
 
2.35E-4 
(1.45E-4) 
Observations 120 120 120 
Adjusted R2 0.814 0.961 0.960* 
Durbin-Watson 0.120 0.697 0.619* 
Full Sample Period (1984-2008) 
Constant 
54.284** 
(2.134) 
Province-specific 
52.010** 
(2.001) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
-0.3254** 
(0.0398) 
-0.1273** 
(0.0343) 
-0.1344** 
(0.0341) 
GDP per Capita 
  One lag 
5.57E-4** 
(3.73E-5) 
3.78E-4** 
(2.42E-5) 
3.80E-4** 
(2.42E-5) 
Change in GDP per 
Capita 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
 
-6.86E-4* 
(3.15E-4) 
-6.20E-4* 
(2.98E-4) 
 
 
-3.12E-5 
(1.29E-4) 
1.02E-4 
(1.22 E-4) 
 
 
-4.19E-5 
(1.30E-4) 
9.14E-5 
(1.23E-4) 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R2 0.689 0.951 0.951† 
Durbin-Watson 0.081 0.299 0.283† 
Post-Data Splice Sample Period (1998-2008) 
Constant 
46.292** 
(3.667) 
Province-specific 
40.601** 
(3.454) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
-0.1192 
(0.0760) 
0.1266 
(0.0860) 
0.0585 
(0.0825) 
GDP per Capita 
  One lag 
6.06E-4** 
(5.70E-5) 
5.51E-4** 
(2.84E-5) 
5.42E-4** 
(2.95E-5) 
Change in GDP per 
Capita 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
 
-1.72E-3** 
(5.27E-4) 
-1.02E-3 
(5.35E-4) 
 
 
-1.20E-4 
(1.01E-4) 
-1.16E-4 
(9.77E-5) 
 
 
-1.42E-4 
(1.10E-4) 
-1.20E-4 
(1.06E-4) 
Observations 110 110 110 
Adjusted R2 0.595 0.987 0.985† 
Durbin-Watson 0.137 1.121 0.842† 
Dependent variable is the employment rate. Post-data-splice sample begins in 1998 for levels, 1999 
for first-differences. *Significant at 95% level. **Significant at 99% level. Pooled regressions across 
10 Canadian provinces.  Standard errors of parameter estimates in brackets. 
† Adj. R2 and D-W of GLS transformed regression. 
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Table 9: 
First Difference Regressions of Layne-Farrar Specification 
Employment Rate, Canadian Pooled Data 
 A. B. C. 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Adjusted Initial Layne-Farrar Sample Period (1984-1995) 
Constant 
-0.02449 
(0.0921) 
Province-specific 
-0.0101 
(0.0747) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
-0.1010* 
(0.0403) 
-0.0969* 
(0.0415) 
-0.1049* 
(0.0406) 
Change in GDP 
per Capita 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
 
5.09E-4** 
(9.88E-5) 
1.25E-5 
(9.25E-5) 
 
 
5.34E-4** 
(1.02E-4) 
2.03E-5 
(9.51E-5) 
 
 
4.85E-4** 
(9.93E-5) 
5.29E-6 
(9.37E-5) 
Observations 120 120 120 
Adjusted R2 0.217 0.188 0.181* 
Durbin-Watson 1.397 1.485 1.207* 
Full Sample Period (1984-2008) 
Constant 
0.07856 
(0.0660) 
Province-specific 
0.1061* 
(0.0533) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
-0.1002** 
(0.0288) 
-0.1010** 
(0.0293) 
-0.0988** 
(0.0288) 
Change in GDP 
per Capita 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
 
3.57E-4** 
(6.53E-5) 
2.04E-5 
(6.15E-5) 
 
 
3.77E-4** 
(6.69E-5) 
3.09E-5 
(6.26E-5) 
 
 
3.26E-4** 
(6.47E-5) 
5.21E-6 
(6.17E-5) 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R2 0.150 0.138 0.118* 
Durbin-Watson 1.703 1.765 1.612* 
Post-Data Splice Sample Period (1999-2008) 
Constant 
0.3652** 
(0.1178) 
Province-specific 
0.3269** 
(0.0901) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
-0.0269 
(0.0824) 
-0.0293 
(0.0862) 
-0.0165 
(0.0831) 
Change in GDP 
per Capita 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
 
8.30E-5 
(9.55E-5) 
2.46E-5 
(9.60E-5) 
 
 
4.87E-5 
(1.05E-4) 
1.77E-5 
(1.04E-4) 
 
 
1.38E-4 
(9.01E-5) 
1.79E-5 
(9.30E-5) 
Observations 100 100 100 
Adjusted R2 -0.019 -0.077 -0.119* 
Durbin-Watson 2.568 2.649 2.387* 
Dependent variable is the change in the employment rate. 
*Significant at 95% level. **Significant at 99% level. Pooled regressions across 10 
Canadian provinces. Standard errors of parameter estimates in brackets. 
* Adj. R2 and D-W of GLS transformed regression. 
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Table 10: 
Complete First Difference Specification 
Employment Rate, Canadian Pooled Data 
 A. B. C. 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Constant 
0.03815 
(0.1473) 
Province-specific 
0.0124 
(0.1517) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
-0.0303 
(0.0263) 
-0.0285 
(0.0263) 
-0.0299 
(0.0262) 
Change in GDP 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
3.63E-11** 
(1.19E-11) 
-2.95E-11* 
(1.17E-11) 
 
6.06E-11** 
(1.38E-11) 
-1.56E-11 
(1.23E-11) 
 
4.27E-11** 
(1.24E-11) 
-2.59E-11* 
(1.18E-11) 
Change in Female 
Participation 
  One lag 
 
0.4312** 
(0.1057) 
 
0.3791** 
(0.1059) 
 
0.4180** 
(0.1051) 
Change in Log 
Total Credit 
  Current 
 
  One lag 
 
 
 
21.005** 
(2.679) 
-12.227** 
(2.103) 
 
 
21.169** 
(2.654) 
-12.733** 
(2.086) 
 
 
21.047** 
(2.657) 
-12.360** 
(2.086) 
Change in Log CPI 
  One lag 
 
-19.650** 
(2.998) 
 
-17.968** 
(3.025) 
 
-19.243** 
(2.989) 
Change in Log 
Commodity Prices 
  One lag 
 
-1.475** 
(0.546) 
 
-1.601** 
(0.542) 
 
-1.508** 
(0.542) 
Observations 250 250 250 
Adjusted R2 0.404 0.416 0.414† 
Durbin-Watson 1.860 2.012 1.897† 
Dependent variable is the change in the employment rate. 
*Significant at 95% level. **Significant at 99% level. Pooled regressions across 10 
Canadian provinces.  Full sample period 1984 – 2008 (adjusted for endpoints of data). 
Standard errors of parameter estimates in brackets. 
†Adj. R2 and D-W of GLS transformed regression. 
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Table 11: 
Unemployment Rate Regressions 
Aggregate U.S. National Data 
A. B. 
Levels First Differences 
Dependent 
Variable 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Dependent 
Variable 
Change in 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Constant 
-14.249 
(16.525) 
Constant 
-0.7502 
(0.4983) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
0.4190 
(0.2362) 
Change in 
Unionization 
  One lag 
0.1552 
(0.2984) 
Change in GDP 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
-4.006E-3** 
(1.141E-3) 
-2.795E-3* 
(1.064E-3) 
Change in GDP 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
-1.465E-3 
(1.123E-3) 
2.184E-3* 
(1.043E-3) 
Log CPI 
  One lag 
 
3.1005 
(2.5598) 
Change in  Log 
CPI 
  One lag 
 
15.023* 
(5.646) 
Observations 30 Observations 30 
Adjusted R2 0.750 Adjusted R2 0.313 
Durbin-Watson 1.387 Durbin-Watson 1.876 
*Significant at 95% level. **Significant at 99% level. Sample 1976 – 2008 (with 
endpoints adjusted for lags, 1979 – 2008).  OLS regressions. Standard errors of 
estimated parameters in brackets. 
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Table 12: 
Employment Rate Regressions 
Aggregate U.S. National Data 
A. B. 
Levels First Differences 
Dependent 
Variable 
Employment Rate 
Dependent 
Variable 
Change in 
Employment Rate 
Constant 
73.748** 
(4.475) 
Constant 
-0.1367 
(0.2427) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
-0.5578** 
(0.1251) 
Change in 
Unionization 
  One lag 
-0.1290 
(0.2559) 
GDP per Capita 
  One lag 
-1.07E-4 
(7.41E-5) 
GDP per Capita 
  One lag 
Redundant 
with below 
Change in GDP 
per Capita 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
 
7.06E-4* 
(3.13 E-4) 
7.23E-4* 
(3.14E-4) 
Change in GDP 
per Capita 
  One lag 
 
  Two lags 
 
 
 
5.54E-4* 
(2.25E-4) 
-2.69E-4 
(2.33E-4) 
Observations 30 Observations 30 
Adjusted R2 0.788 Adjusted R2 0.128 
Durbin-Watson 0.732 Durbin-Watson 1.668 
*Significant at 95% level. **Significant at 99% level. Sample 1976 – 2008 (with 
endpoints adjusted for lags, 1979 – 2008).  OLS regressions.  Standard errors of 
estimated parameters in brackets. 
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Table 13: 
Cross-Sectional Regressions 
U.S. State-Level Data 
 A. B. C. D. 
 Unemployment Rate Employment Rate 
 
Simple 
Correlation 
Behavioural 
Specification 
Simple 
Correlation 
Behavioural 
Specification 
Constant 
4.5915** 
(0.3923) 
7.6764** 
(0.9932) 
63.644** 
(1.313) 
8.7522** 
(3.0944) 
Unionization 
  One lag 
0.0638* 
(0.0316) 
0.0384 
(0.0293) 
-0.0229 
(0.1058) 
-0.0425 
(0.0388) 
Change in GDP 
  One lag 
 
 
-28.821* 
(11.230) 
 
35.311* 
(15.173) 
Inflation 
  One lag 
 
-80.903** 
(29.309) 
  
Female Labour Force 
Participation 
  One lag 
   
0.8938** 
(0.0506) 
Observations 51 51 51 51 
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.237 -0.019 0.866 
Durbin-Watson 2.163 2.052 2.145 1.685 
Dependent variable is the change in the employment rate. 
*Significant at 95% level. **Significant at 99% level. Cross-sectional data for 2008 (and year earlier for 
right-hand-side variables) for 50 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia. Standard errors of estimated 
parameters in brackets. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1. The authors’ names are listed alphabetically. 
2. Similar references to Canada have been made, by both sides, in the U.S. debate over health care 
reform, so U.S. political “junkies” are getting to know a lot about Canada these days! 
3. For summary statistics on Canada-U.S. labour market performance, see Table 1 that accompanies the 
“Open Statement by Canadian Scholars on Unionization and the Economic and Social Well-Being of 
Canadians,” reproduced in this issue of Just Labour. 
4. Indeed, it is unusual for an author to report regression results when the main explanatory variable 
considered is not statistically significant.  The author claims in the text (p. 27) that in some regressions 
the unionization variable is “nearly significant.” 
5. The discussion that follows focuses on the two sets of statistically significant regression results 
reported by Layne-Farrar (and which were referenced in her predictions of the negative impact of the 
Employee Free Choice Act on U.S. labour market outcomes); the non-significant regression linking 
unionization to business investment is not considered. 
6. In Section 7 below some initial analysis of U.S. data is presented, which suggests that there is no 
evidence in the U.S. experience of a negative correlation between unionization and labour market 
performance. 
7. And Layne-Farrar’s claim (p. 20, fn 58) that no such data is available after 1997 is false. 
8. Statistics Canada replaced its previous CALURA union membership data series, based on a survey of 
unions, with a more comprehensive and robust series based on the LFS survey of households, 
beginning in 1997.  This leaves one year (1996) for which no unionization data are available; it also 
introduces a problem of potential non-consistency in the unionization data pre-1995 and post-1997, 
which we consider in our own regressions below. 
9. The classic reference is Granger and Newbold (1974). Layne-Farrar recognizes the difference between 
correlation and causation (p. 22, fn 62), but her proposed solution to the issue (lagging the 
independent variable) does not address the problem of non-stationarity. 
10. The Layne-Farrar regressions were performed on pooled data for all of the provinces. We re-create 
those regressions in Section 6 below.  But as discussed, we also apply the Layne-Farrar specification 
to aggregate national Canadian data, in Section 5. The regression reported in Column A of Table 2 
thus corresponds to the regression reported in Column A of Table 3. 
11. For example, perhaps a theorist might argue that well-off foreigners will declare more of their income 
on Canadian tax returns if they were confident that the revenues they pay do not end up supporting 
welfare programs instituted thanks to union lobbying efforts; that businesses invest more (and hence 
write off their existing capital stock faster) when troublesome unions are less intrusive; that 
consumers must take on more debt when their wages are lower as a result of lower unionization; or 
that individuals are more likely to take up bad habits (like smoking and drinking) when they are 
forced to subsist on poverty-level wages thanks to the absence of unions.  All of these “theories” are 
consistent with the econometric results reported in Columns B through E of Table 2 – and all, of 
course, are laughable. 
12. And these differences are acknowledged by Layne-Farrar when she provides a range of possible 
predicted outcomes for U.S. employment and unemployment resulting from the Employee Free Choice 
Act. 
13. One possible indicator of mis-specification is a low value (significantly lower than 2) for the Durbin-
Watson test score which is routinely reported by econometric programs.  Layne-Farrar does not 
report Durbin-Watson scores for her regressions.  However, the re-creation of her findings which is 
conducted in Section 6 of this paper indicates that D-W scores for these equations are indeed too low, 
reinforcing the suspicion of mis-specification bias. 
14. Palley (2006) reports international empirical evidence suggesting that in fact central banks increase 
interest rates more aggressively in jurisdictions with higher union density. 
15. The divergence in labour market performance is considered by a special series of articles introduced 
by Riddell and Sharpe (1998). 
16. Stanford (2008) considers some dimensions of this growing reliance on primary commodity exports, 
especially petroleum. 
17. The OECD (2006) report does not specify whether this is due to a reduction in employment, or an 
increase in the labour force participation of the non-employed.  Either can affect the reported 
unemployment rate, but with very different economic (and social) effects. 
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18. These other control variables were not consistently significant in the results reported in Layne-
Farrar’s Table 3, either.  Here and below, we conclude that a variable is statistically significant if the 
null hypothesis  can be rejected at the 95% level of confidence. 
19. As discussed above, the original Layne-Farrar regressions are reportedly estimated over a longer 
sample period, from 1976 through 1997.  But original data for all variables (excluding her 
“extrapolated” data and years for which provincial CPI and GDP data are unavailable) is only 
available (after adjusting for lags) for the period from 1984 through 1995. 
20. In 1995 the former survey of unions was discontinued; beginning in 1997 unionization rates are 
calculated based on the labour force survey.  For our regressions an approximate 1996 unionization 
rate was interpolated between the 1995 and 1997 data points. 
21. The first data point from the new series on unionization was 1997.  The first year for which the 
equation can consider lagged unionization is therefore 1998, and the first year it can consider the 
lagged change in unionization is 1999. 
22. We hasten to emphasize that by successfully re-creating Layne-Farrar’s findings (in this section and 
then, for the employment rate, in section 6.b.1) using our own data set, we are in no way validating 
the legitimacy or interpretation of those results – rather, we are simply confirming how those results 
were attained.  For all the reasons described above, in our judgment Layne-Farrar’s inferences are 
invalid and highly misleading. 
23. As noted in Section 2 above, it is our opinion that the random effects approach is not appropriate in 
this setting, since it is modeling the labour market performance of entire jurisdictions, not randomly 
selected agents.  However we report the results anyway to preserve full comparability with the 
Layne-Farrar analysis; random effects results should be interpreted with caution.  
24. Layne-Farrar did not report Durbin-Watson statistics for her regressions. 
25. As noted above, Layne-Farrar (unusually) did not report Durbin-Watson statistics for her regressions, 
nor attempt to correct her results for this clear evidence of autocorrelation in the error term. 
26. As reported in Table 1, we can confidently conclude that first-differenced transformations of almost 
all of the variables included in Layne-Farrar’s regressions are stationary. 
27. There were no significant qualitative differences in these results for the two sub-periods considered 
above: 1984 through 1995, and 1999 through 2008.  In particular, the unionization variable was never 
statistically significant in any of these sub-period regressions.  Full results for these sub-periods are 
available on request from the authors. 
28. As with the unemployment rate regressions, our re-creation of Layne-Farrar’s results in no way 
should imply that those re-created results are robust or valid.  We have simply demonstrated how 
they were attained. 
29. Once again Table 10 presents only the results of this larger model for the full sample period (1984 
through 2008).  There were no major qualitative differences in the results for sub-samples (1984 to 
1995, and 1999 to 2008), and unionization was never significant.  Full results for the sub-sample 
periods are available from the authors. 
30. Perhaps this helps to explain why Layne-Farrar conducted her analysis using Canadian data, rather 
than U.S. data. 
31. These figures are calculated by simply applying Canada’s higher employment and participation 
rates, and lower unemployment rate, to the U.S. working age population for 2008. 
32. Measured by the share of households with less than half of median income, Canada’s poverty rate in 
2000-2004 was 11.4 percent, versus 17 percent in the U.S.  This 5.4 percentage point difference, 
applied to the total population of U.S. households, is equivalent to 6.5 million households.  Poverty 
data as reported in the United Nations Development Program Human Development Report 2007/08, 
Table 4. 
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